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ESSAY
THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF ATTICUS FINCH*
Thomas L. Shaffer**
The forebearing use of power does not only form a touchstone, but the
manner in which an individual enjoys certain advantages over others is a
test of a true gentleman.
The power which the strong have over the weak, the employer over the
employed, the educated over the unlettered, the experienced over the con-
fiding, even the clever over the silly-the forebearing or inoffensive use of
all this power or authority, or a total abstinence from it when the case
admits it, will show the gentleman in a plain light. The gentleman does
not needlessly and unnecessarily remind an offender of a wrong he may
have committed against him. He can not only forgive, he can forget; and he
strives for that nobleness of self and mildness of character which impart
sufficient strength to let the past be but the past. A true man of honor
feels humbled himself when he cannot help humbling others.
-Robert E. Lee***
Atticus Finch was a lawyer in private practice in the rural town of
Maycomb, Alabama, for all of his adult life. He was the direct de-
scendant of Simon Finch, an immigrant to Alabama from Cornwall
by way of Jamaica and Philadelphia. Simon Finch was trained as a
physician and probably practiced his art on his slaves, employees
and family, but he made his fortune in farming on a riverside plan-
tation west of Maycomb called Finch's Landing. Atticus Finch was
one of three children. His younger brother, Dr. John Hale Finch,
was a physician in Tennessee. His sister, Mrs. James (Alexandra)
* Editor's Note:
The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch revives the inclusion of works in this Review that
do not fall within the traditional definition of an "article." This essay utilizes the literary
character of Atticus Finch, the lawyer in To Kill A Mockingbird, to illustrate some of the
moral and ethical dilemmas that may confront the practicing attorney. The editorial staff
believes that works such as The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch serve a valuable and
worthy function by stimulating thought about the nature of law and its practice. The
conversational quotations by the characters of To Kill A Mockingbird are not cited to the
novel since these quotations are not intended as resource references.
** B.A., University of Albuquerque, 1958; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 1961; Profes-
sor of Law, Washington and Lee University. My thanks to the Lilly Endowment for the
Open Faculty Fellowship grant which supported my research and writing, including this
essay, in 1979-1980.
*** IV D. FREEMAN, ROBERT E. LEE 499 (1935).
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Hancock, and her husband lived at Finch's Landing.
Atticus's wife died in 1928, leaving him to raise two children: a
son, Jeremy Atticus (Jem), born in 1922, and a daughter, Jean
Louise (Scout), born in 1927. Atticus represented Maycomb in the
Alabama legislature for several terms. He was a member of the
Methodist Church. He did not attend college or law school; he was
admitted to the Bar of the Alabama Supreme Court after serving
an apprenticeship in a Montgomery law office.
Atticus Finch's law practice was largely civil-the minor dis-
putes and needs for private planning of his rural clients. He did
not seek or enjoy criminal cases. His daughter said, "There was
nothing [he] could do for his clients except be present at their de-
parture, an occasion that was probably the beginning of my fa-
ther's profound distaste for the practice of criminal law." Never-
theless, he did some criminal-defense work, as every general
practitioner does. The most famous example is his defense of
Thomas Robinson, who was convicted of capital rape in 1935 in
Maycomb County, in Atticus's fifty-first year.
Our information on the Robinson case comes from an account
written by Scout, who was eight years old when the case was
brought to trial. She later wrote the story of that case, relating
anecdotes and personal impressions from her perspective as the
defense lawyer's daughter which give some insight into Atticus's
handling of the case.1 The story of the Robinson case, the anec-
dotes and the impressions help to explain how Atticus Finch is a
hero, and how lawyers become heroes in America. These facts,
anecdotes and impressions are also, and therefore, the source of a
moral theology.2
It is unlikely that Mr. Robinson committed the rape for which
he was convicted. Indeed, it is unlikely that the "victim," Mayella
Ewell, was raped at all. In his speech to the jury, Atticus claimed
1. H. LEE, To KIu A MOCKINGBIR (1960). See H. FooTR, THE SCREENPLAY OF To KILL
A MOCKINGBIRD (1964); First Novel: Mockingbird Call, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1961, at 83; Liter-
ary Laurels for a Novice, LIFE, May 26, 1961, at 78A.
2. The methodology I am attempting here is suggested in S. HAUERWAS, VISION AND
VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION (1974); S. HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE
CHRISTIAN LIE: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (1975); S. HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND
TRAGEDY (1977); J. MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY (1974); T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A
CHRISTIAN AND A LAwYER ch. 16 (1981); and 0. WmLuAms & J. HOUCK, FULL VALUE (1978).
See Roberts, A Theology for Christian Critics, 45 J. Am. A. RELIGION 275 (1977). "When a
Jew can provide no answer, he at least has a tale to tell .... A good story in Hasidism is
not about miracles, but about friendship and hope-the greatest miracles of all." E. WIEsEL,
FOUR HAsmIC MASTERS AND THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST MELANCHOLY 2-3 (1978).
[Vol. 42:181
MORAL THEOLOGY
that Miss Ewell had attempted to seduce Mr. Robinson and after
failing, or at least after having been interrupted in that design, had
accused him of rape. "The defendant is not guilty," Atticus said,
"but somebody in this courtroom is. . . . She has committed no
crime, she has merely broken a rigid and time-honored code of our
society, a code so severe that whoever breaks it is hounded from
our midst as unfit to live with. She is the victim of cruel poverty
and ignorance, but I cannot pity her: she is white .... She was
white and she tempted a Negro. She did something that in our
society is unspeakable; she kissed a black man. Not an old Uncle,
but a strong young Negro man. No code mattered to her before she
broke it, but it came crashing down on her afterwards."
Atticus argued that the principal witnesses for the prosecu-
tion, Mayella Ewell and her father, were not worthy of objective
belief, but "have presented themselves to you.., in the cynical
confidence that you gentlemen would go along with them on the
assumption-the evil assumption-that all Negroes lie, that all
Negroes are basically immoral beings, that all Negro men are not
to be trusted around our women." He concluded his jury summa-
tion with a moving appeal to the principle of equality under the
law. Nonetheless, the jury convicted Mr. Robinson and sentenced
him to death.
The case was remarkable mainly in the way in which Atticus
tried it-as an accusation of the white woman who was Mr. Robin-
son's accuser and, through her, as a confrontation of two conven-
tions: that black men in Alabama in the 1930's were a menace to
white women and that black people could not be trusted to tell the
truth about encounters with white women (or, for that matter,
with white mens).
Atticus was appointed by the court to represent Mr. Robinson,
possibly because the judge of the court, John Taylor, was the sort
of man a commentator today might call progressive, and possibly
because the Supreme Court of the United States had decided, in a
similar Alabama case in 1932, that impoverished defendants in
capital trials were entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.4 It
is not clear, however, that Judge Taylor expected Atticus to defend
3. W. FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST (1948). See J. BRYER, SIXTEEN MODERN AMER-
IcAN AUTHORS: A SURvEY OF RESEARCH OF CRmIrCisM 238-52 (1974); Elias, Gavin Stevens:
Intruder?, 3 FAULKNER STUmES 1 (1954); Vickery, Gavin Stevens: From Rhetoric to Dialec-
tic, 2 FAULKNER STUDIES 1 (1953).
4. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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his client as vigorously as he did, and it is unlikely that the judge
expected a defense which would make the remarkable charge that
a white woman had tried to seduce a black man and then had lied
about it. There were conventions for-limits on-defenses of black
people. William Faulkner reported such a conventional defense in
his account of an innocent black man accused of the murder of a
white man in Mississippi, a few years before the Robinson case, in
which defense counsel assumed without asking that his client had
killed the victim. Defense counsel, without examining the merits of
the case, planned to bargain for a manslaughter plea and prison
sentence on the ground that the defendant was old and not well.5
Whatever Judge Taylor expected, it seems clear that Mr.
Finch's neighbors did not expect a defense which attacked the de-
fendant's white accusers. Scout reported a conversation she had
with her father before the trial:
"'[T]here's some high talk around town to the effect that I
shouldn't do too much about defending this man.'
"'If you shouldn't be defendin' him, then why are you doin'
it?'
"'For a number of reasons,' said Atticus. 'The main one is, if I
didn't I couldn't hold up my head in town, I couldn't represent
this county in the legislature, I couldn't even tell you or Jem not to
do something again.'
"'You mean if you didn't defend that man, Jem and me
wouldn't have to mind you any more?'
"'That's about right.'
"'Why?'
"'Because I could never ask you to mind me again ....'
"'Atticus, are we going to win it?'
"'No, honey.'"
On another occasion Scout had to suffer criticism of her father
from an elderly woman in the neighborhood. She later complained
to her father about it. He said, "When summer comes you'll have
to keep your head about far worse things ... it's not fair ... I
know that, but sometimes we have to make the best of things, and
the way we conduct ourselves when the chips are down-well, all I
can say is, when you and Jem are grown, maybe you'll look back on
this with some compassion and some feeling that I didn't let you
down. This case, Tom Robinson's case, is something that goes to
5. See W. FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST (1948).
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the essence of a man's conscience-Scout, I couldn't go to church
and worship God if I didn't try to help that man... before I can
live with other folks I've got to live with myself. The one thing that
doesn't abide by majority rule is a person's conscience."
Shortly before the trial was to begin, the sheriff warned At-
ticus that his client would be in danger if he were moved from the
Abbottsville jail to the Maycomb jail. Atticus insisted that he be
moved anyway. ("You can keep him one night, can't you? I don't
think anybody in Maycomb'll begrudge me a client, with times this
hard.") The danger was so real, though, that Atticus felt it neces-
sary to station himself during the night in front of the jail to pro-
tect his client. In the face of this threat, he told the sheriff, "That
boy might go to the chair, but he's not going until the truth's told.
And you know what the truth is." His children and their friend,
Dill (Charles Baker Harris), waited outside the jail, too. They were
all there when the lynch mob came for Mr. Robinson. It was Scout
who prevented violence by shaming a member of the mob (a man
who had been a client of Atticus's in an unrelated civil matter)
who had come to lynch Mr. Robinson. Afterwards, Atticus said,
"You children made Walter Cunningham stand in my shoes for a
minute. That was enough." Before the trial he said to his sister,
"I'm in favor of Southern womanhood as much as anybody, but
not for preserving polite fiction at the expense of a human life."
These statements are reported by Scout in relation to the Robin-
son case. Scout also reported an incident in which Atticus killed a
mad dog with a single, well-aimed rifle shot. She wrote that she
and her brother were impressed with the shooting; until then they
thought their father, at the age of fifty, was feeble. His statements
and the anecdote illustrate the bravery of Atticus Finch.
Atticus's statements before the Robinson trial indicate that he
had little hope of success in the case, although, after the verdict,
he indicated that he hoped for success on appeal.' In less optimis-
tic moments he knew that he would only be able to declare the
truth of the matter. He was uncommonly devoted to the truth. He
would not even lie a little to comfort his client. Calpurnia, the
Finches' cook, was asked by a friend of Mr. Robinson why Atticus
6. Compare a similar unwarranted optimism in a similar hero, Judge James Edwin
Horton, who presided in the second capital trial of Haywood Patterson, one of the "Scotts-
boro Boys." See D. CARnF, SCOMrBORO: A TRAGEDY OF Tim AimiC cA SouTH 194-273
(1969); H. PATTERSON & E. CONRAD, SCOrrSBORO Boy 46-62, 277-95, 313-20 (1973); T. SHA-
FER, supra note 2, at ch. 14.
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had not lifted the spirits of the Robinson family by telling them
that Mr. Robinson would be acquitted. "Mr. Finch couldn't say
somethin's so when he dopsn't know for sure," was the reply. What
Calpurnia did not know was that Atticus had told his client and
his client's wife not to expect acquittal.
Perhaps his client and his client's family and friends under-
stood that truth was more important than comfort. The black
people of Maycomb stood silently after the trial as Atticus, dis-
appointed and frustrated, made his way out of the courtroom. "I
looked around," Scout wrote. "They were standing. All around us
and in the balcony on the opposite wall, the Negroes were getting
to their feet. Reverend Sykes's voice was as distant as Judge Tay-
lor's, 'Miss Jean Louise, stand up. Your father's passin'!'"
The townspeople of Maycomb disapproved of Atticus's de-
fense tactics, but he did not become a pariah. "People were con-
tent to re-elect him to the state legislature that year, as usual,
without opposition," Scout reported. "I came to the conclusion
that people were just peculiar." She and at least one other ob-
server, a neighbor, Mrs. Maude Atkinson (Miss Maudie), said that
this acceptance--or, rather, this failure to condemn him consist-
ently-was evidence of the town's need for someone to describe the
Robinson case truthfully. "We're the safest folks in the world,"
Miss Maudie said. "We're so rarely called on to be Christians, but
when we are we've got men like Atticus to go for us. . . . Whether
Maycomb knows it or not, we're paying the highest tribute we can
pay a man. We trust him to do right. It's that simple." But, she
said, it was only "the handful of people in this town with back-
ground" who could be expected to understand the point. She dis-
tinguished herself from "the old Sarum bunch"-the mob who
came to the jail to lynch Mr. Robinson-and, probably, from the
jury as well.
According to Scout, her father's principal concern, after the
trial and after Mr. Robinson had been killed by policemen in Ab-
botsville as he was attempting to escape, was that the experience
would make his children bitter or, worse, would give them what he
called "Maycomb's usual disease." It is important to the under-
standing of Atticus Finch to see that he was able to tell the truth
about his community but still remain fond of his community-a
moral quality which General Lee may have encompassed when he
said a gentleman is humbled by having to humble others. This is
also the moral quality which Reinhold Niebuhr called the ability to
[Vol. 42:181
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be ironic. 7 "He liked Maycomb," Scout stated. "He was Maycomb
County born and bred; he knew his people and they knew him, and
because of Simon Finch's industry, Atticus was related by blood or
marriage to nearly every family in the town." Although Atticus
shared the rural South's suspicion of the North, "[T]his time," he
said, "we're fighting our friends. But remember this, no matter
how bitter things get, they're still our friends and this is still our
home."
After the trial he said to his sister, "This is our home ...
We've made it this way for them, they might as well learn to cope
with it." Reflecting on the verdict he said, "I don't know [how the
jury could do it], but they did it. They've done it before and they
did it tonight and they'll do it again, and when they do it-seems
that only children weep." He told his son, "I won't live to see the
law changed, and if you live to see it you'll be an old man." Weeks
later he said he thought that Jem would not, after all, be embit-
tered by the experience. "What he was really doing was storing it
away for a while, until enough time passed. Then he would be able
to think about it and sort things out." Atticus seemed to want to
bequeath both his society and his irony to his children.8
One other anecdote from this family account of Atticus's
life-or, rather, of the year of the Robinson case-illustrates the
qualities of character which made it possible for him to see the
Robinson case as he did, to fashion and present the defense as he
did, and lose the case without becoming bitter about his commu-
nity. The anecdote involves the elderly woman who most loudly
denounced him for his defense of Mr. Robinson-the widow of
Henry Lafayette Dubose.
On the second or third occasion when Mrs. Dubose called to
the. children from her front porch to denounce their father, Jem
Finch stormed into Mrs. Dubose's flower garden and destroyed her
camellias. He was called to account for this act by his father; in
settlement, Jem agreed to read aloud to Mrs. Dubose from Ivan-
hoe. "She's an old lady and she's ill. Just hold your head high and
be a gentleman. Whatever she says to you, it's your job," Atticus
told his son, "not to let her make you mad." As it turned out, the
destruction of the camellias was only part of the reason for the
reading of Ivanhoe. Jem and Scout were required to go to Mrs.
7. R. NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1952).
8. See Shaffer & Rodes, Law for Those Who Are To Die, in NEw MEAINGS OF DEATH
291 (H. Feifel ed. 1977).
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Dubose's house daily, for several hours, in order to help her
through the pain of withdrawal from morphine addiction. Atticus
had learned of the addiction when he interviewed Mrs. Dubose
before drafting her will. Mrs. Dubose said she was dying, and she
intended to overcome the addiction before she died. Atticus, ex-
plaining this to the children after Mrs. Dubose died, said: "I
wanted you to see what real courage is, instead of getting the idea
that courage is a man with a gun in his hand" (an allusion perhaps
to the mad-dog incident). "It's when you know you're licked before
you begin but you begin anyway and you see it through no matter
what. You rarely win, but sometimes you do. Mrs. Dubose won, all
ninety-eight pounds of her. According to her views, she died be-
holden to nothing and nobody. She was the bravest person I ever
knew."
In this analysis of the moral theology of Atticus Finch, I sug-
gest that his heroism centers in his insistence on telling the truth.
This truth telling was:
(I) an expression of the person he was and of the community he sought for
his children and neighbors;
(II) an expression of the virtue of courage and also (and therefore) the
expression of a theology;
(III) a political act; and
(IV) a professional act.
In these ways Atticus Finch's story is the story of a hero who is an
American, a Southerner, and a lawyer-all of these and a Christian
as well.
I. TELLING THE TRUTH IN THE COMMUNITY
Atticus insisted on, and lived by, telling the truth. He is remark-
able not because others in Maycomb were liars or because they
lived in an especially dishonest culture. Rather, he is extraordinary
because others-the children excepted-were, more than Atticus,
bound to the conventional cultural delusions of Maycomb; they,
more than Atticus, had "Maycomb's usual disease." Atticus, more
than others in the town, saw what the truth was and told the truth.
He concluded that his seeing and telling of the truth justified risk:
risk to his own welfare, risk to the welfare of his children, and risk
9. See S. HAUERwAs, VISION AND ViRTuE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION 30-
45 (1974), discussing Iris Murdoch and Simon Weil, explaining this in terms of delusion
(self-deception) and convention.
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to the maintenance of civility in Maycomb-which especially val-
ued civility-and therefore risk to the preservation of Maycomb's
culture. My view is that Atticus insisted on telling the truth, more
so than others, because seeing and telling the truth was the way
Atticus could know who he was and what his community was.10 His
telling the truth also permitted him to imagine the sort of commu-
nity he sought to protect for his children and neighbors.", Because
he told the truth, because he had a relatively clear idea of himself
and his community, and because he was brave, he was able to con-
front the conventional, cultural untruth. In doing so, Atticus of-
fered his life (as he did in front of the jail facing the lynch mob),
the lives of his children, and the security of his neighbors. His con-
frontation was in aid of who he was, and also in aid of what his
community was. In both respects,.Atticus was integrating and pro-
tecting what was, and what was good.12
This view of Atticus's character rests on more than the mo-
mentous occasion of the trial. Atticus's telling of the truth takes on
heroic proportions in the trial scenes, but the results of his insis-
tence on truth there are, in a sense, tragic.13 Truth telling was fu-
tile for Tom Robinson and perilous for Atticus's children, who
were sickened during the trial and almost murdered afterwards.
The trial scenes tell more about what happens to a truthful person
than they tell about how Atticus came to be a truthful person. The
scenes which show how he came to be the person he was are not in
the trial, but in his daily routine and habits. Disposition,"' more
10. P. TILLiCH, MoRA.rrY AND BEYOND 13-30 (1963).
11. Hauerwas & Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 569
(1979). See T. SHAFER, supra note 2, at ch. 18-19, for a revised version of the 1979 article.
12. See S. HAuERWAs, supra note 9. Hauerwas calls into question both delusion and
convention. See also S. HAURRwAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRmST LIn: A STUDy IN THEo-
LOGICAL ETHICS 125 (1975) (thought and belief determine action). J. GUSTAPSON, CHRIST AND
THE MORAL Lna 255 (1968), shows how the "excessive scrupulosity" of the liberal conscience
also helps to explain the personal and cultural evils which I am attributing to delusion and
convention. In either case the behavior is, as Hauerwas and I analyze it, a failure to hope,
and in both cases loyalty to the community is erroneously used to guide moral life. See
Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 11. See also I B. HIIARNG, THE LAw OF CHRIST 273 (1963)
(conventional-and, in Haring's point, civil authority-are not entitled to a presumption of
justice).
13. Tragedy is, in this sense, though, the triumph of meaning over power. S.
HAUERWAs, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY (1977). See T. SHaAPFR, supra note 2, at ch. 14;
Shaffer, Book Review, 23 Am. J. Jums. 245 (1978).
14. J. GUSTAsoN, CHRIST AND THE MORAL LIFE 120-30, 238-71 (1968), uses the term
"disposition" to describe what the Thomistic tradition calls virtue or good habit and
what Luther described as the effect of the law of love on routine interpersonal behavior.
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than the crisis, illustrates how it is that virtue is a matter of seeing
with the self and learning to see with the self, and how moral
life-and heroism, too-are revealed in the ordinary. In ordinary
truth telling Atticus trained himself for momentous truth telling.15
An example is the answers Atticus gave to his children when they
asked him about the law. He explained the law of entailments to
Scout as he would have explained it to Judge Taylor. He gave
Scout a textbook definition of rape when she asked about the
charge against Tom Robinson. Scout asked her Uncle Jack what
"whore" means, and the physician evaded her question; when At-
ticus learned of the evasion he was angry with his brother. "When
a child asks you something, answer him, for goodness' sake. But
don't make a production of it. Children are children, but they can
spot an evasion quicker than adults, and evasion simply muddles
'em." He wanted his children to know the truth and, more than
knowing the truth, to know how to tell the truth. When I sug-
gested, above, that he sought to leave his children with his love of
the community and with his irony, this is what I meant.16
Truth to Atticus was a matter of being himself. To understand
that this is so, and how it is so, is to begin to understand why he is
a hero. A hero is a clear, memorable person, but he is also a person
in a place, a person among persons. A hero shows his community
what its values cost. Atticus's values were Maycomb's values-
otherwise he would have been only a brave eccentric. Truth is how
Atticus understood who he was, both personally and as a citizen of
Maycomb, so that not telling the truth would have caused him to
lose his grasp on who he was, to lose control of himself, to suffer
personal disintegration, and to lose his way among the people with
whom he lived. However, in Scout's account there is at least one
Gustafson relates his term to the Pauline phrases "manner of life" and "mind among your-
self, which was in Christ Jesus." Philippians 1:27, 2:5.
15. S. HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE CHRIsTIAN LIFE: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETH-
iCs (1975). In the screenplay, Scout says: "There just didn't seem to be anyone or thing
Atticus couldn't explain. Though it wasn't a talent that would arouse the admiration of our
friends, Jem and I had to admit he was very good at that, but that was all he was good at,
we thought." H. FOOTE, supra note 1, at 50.
16. Irony is not despair; Jews and Christians believe that truth can be found. H.R.
NIEBUHR, RADICAL MONOTHEISM AND WESTRN CULTURE 68-73 (Harper Torchbooks ed.
1960).
17. See note 11 supra. Part of the idea is expressed in Trollope's novel Ralph the Heir
as "a want of reality in character." The Jewish theologian Martin Buber would have added
that one finds his personality in relation with another person. T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at
ch. 3. Protestant moral theology emphasizes that God speaks concretely (and directly) in the
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situation in which Atticus decided not to tell the truth.
If truth telling was the central value for him, he did not live at
the center of his life without struggle. His explanations to his chil-
dren and his clients did not cause struggle because he had trained
himself to tell the truth and to do it as a matter of habit-that is,
of virtue. The public defense of Tom Robinson did not cause him
struggle either because he had trained himself to accept that truth
exacts a high price. (He also trained his children to accept that
fact.) Perhaps when Atticus did finally struggle with whether to
tell the truth, he struggled as one who was contending with what
was most important to him. His was then a spiritual trauma, a
struggle to save his idea of who he was, as one in physical trauma
struggles for life and is stunned and dulled in the process of con-
centrating his energy on survival. Atticus, when his crisis came, did
not deal with a manifest need to lie as if he were balancing inter-
ests or interpreting a principle; he struggled as one who may not
survive.18 This is the theme which gives Scout's account its title.
Robert Ewell, the father of the rape "victim" in the Robinson
case, was humiliated and saw his daughter humiliated by Atticus
in the trial. The community, which knew the truth but could not
tell the truth, knew that Mayella was not raped; it knew but would
not say that she attempted to seduce a black man and then lied
about it, that her father lied, too, and that her father was willing to
see Tom Robinson die to protect him and his daughter from a pub-
lic certification of the truth. The community knew all of this in a
way that it would not know if Atticus had not proclaimed the truth
in the trial.
Robert Ewell became obsessed with his humiliation and with
the idea that Atticus was the source of his humiliation. He stalked
the Finch children, attacked them, and nearly killed them. The
murder attempt occurred at night on the road between the Finch
home and the school. In the aftermath of the murder attempt,
Ewell was dead, mysteriously killed; Jem was unconscious, injured,
and being cared for in the Finch home; Atticus, Sheriff Heck Tate,
Scout, and an unidentified neighbor were gathered around Jem's
relation Buber called "I-Thou." J. GUSTAFSON, supra note 14, at 11-60; S. HAUERWAs, supra
note 9, at 1-8.
18. See P. TILLICH, supra note 10. Gustafson illustrates how almost all Christian
moralists teach that a moral choice made in faith is also made in freedom and in trust; it is
made by one who can endure making a mistake. "Extreme scrupulosity" in such matters is a
sin against hope. J. GUSTAFSON, supra note 14, at 255.
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bed. The neighbor was Arthur (Boo) Radley, a recluse the children
knew about but had never seen. It gradually became clear that
Radley, who had been watching and invisibly befriending the chil-
dren for months, heard or saw Ewell's attack and came to the de-
fense of the children with a kitchen knife. Radley killed Ewell, but
Scout, who was entangled in her costume from a school play, and
Jem, who was unconscious, did not know that Radley killed
Ewell-or even that Radley was there.
Sheriff Tate knew the truth but proposed to explain Ewell's
death with a lie; he proposed to say that Ewell killed himself by
falling on his own knife. The sheriff was not acting to conceal a
crime; Radley's act was undoubtedly justifiable and Radley was in
no danger of prosecution. He was in danger, though, of being made
a public figure ("All the ladies in Maycomb includin' my wife'll be
knocking on his door bringing angel food cakes"). The sheriff
thought that this exposure would destroy the frail survival Radley
had built for himself, hidden in an old house. "There's a black boy
dead for no reason, and the man responsible for it is dead. Let the
dead bury their dead this time, Mr. Finch," the sheriff said. "To
my way of thinkin'. . . taking the one man who's done you and
this town a great service an' draggin' him with his shy ways into
the limelight-to me, that's a sin. It's a sin and I'm not about to
have it on my head."
Atticus initially resisted the lie, refused to be involved in it,
and insisted that the truth be told. Finally, he changed his mind.
"Scout," he said, "Mr. Ewell fell on his knife. Can you possibly
understand?"
"Yes, sir, I understand."
"What do you mean?"
"Well, it'd be sort of like shootin' a mockingbird, wouldn't it?"
Atticus thus decided to join in the sheriff's lie to Maycomb.
"Atticus put his face in my hair and rubbed it," Scout said. "Then
he got up and walked across the porch into the shadows, his youth-
ful step had returned. Before he went inside the house, he stopped
in front of Boo Radley. 'Thank you for my children, Arthur,' he
said."
Doesn't that mean Atticus's moral theology should be de-
scribed in some way other than as telling the truth? I don't think
so. But his decision to tell a lie cannot be explained as the ordinary
consequence of a desire-a desire which is to be expected in a gen-
tleman-to avoid suffering for Boo Radley. Atticus did not evade
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the truth to avoid suffering for himself, or for his children, or for
his client and his client's family, or for the community. There is
more to his regard for Boo Radley than the gentleman's wish that
others not suffer. If the truth must be told, the angel food cakes
must be borne. Nor will it do to say that this lie was not Atticus's
lie. Atticus's view of what was truth did not rest on casuistry.1 9 He
is among the American "republican" lawyers whose professional
idea traces to the first generation after the Revolution20 and to
such things as General Lee's definition of a gentleman. If a lie is
told it will be his lie, too. If it is possible to regard Atticus as a
hero whose character is built on telling the truth, and at the same
time to explain his decision not to kill the mockingbird, the expla-
nation will have to come from a look at who he was rather than at
his analytical prowess.
I claim that the decision to protect Boo Radley shows some-
thing about truth telling rather than something about some other
moral value. That, surely, was Scout's purpose in including the
story in her account of the Robinson case; she did not, after Boo
Radley returned to his house, elaborate another definition of At-
ticus and of Maycomb. Her account up to that point is a story
about telling the truth; she was not being cynical, nor was she tell-
ing some other story, when she ended with Atticus telling a lie. But
the decision in the Radley dilemma does show that Atticus's truth
telling was not a matter of principle, of obeying a rule. His insis-
tence on the truth in the Robinson case-even though the truth
did Robinson no good, and Atticus knew it would do him no
good-illustrates a commitment which is deeper in the sinews and
in the culture than are principles.2 Again, this is so or Scout's
19. See, e.g., W. FRNKENA, ETHICS 13-14, 26, 55-56 (2d ed. 1973). A tragic choice, in
Hauerwas's sense, was possible. S. HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY (1977). But see
P. TILLicH, supra note 10. Wiesel says that Rabbi Pinhas of Koretz taught:
When telling lies would be considered as grave a transgression as adultery, the Mes-
siah would appear .... Summoned to testify on behalf of a man whose innocence
he doubted ... Rebbe Raphael spent all night weeping: he could not bring himself to
tell a possible lie. He cried and cried. And died at dawn.
E. WiEsEL, FOUR HAsIDIC MASTERS AND THEmR STRUGGLE AGAINST MELANCHOLY 18-20 (1978).
These may be extreme views of the duty to tell the truth, but if so, they were applied in
specific reference to Atticus's decision to protect Boo Radley with a lie. The Roman Catholic
Legion of Decency rated the film version of the story as unacceptable for adolescents until
the moviemakers revised the last scene. Ostling, Coutu & Cronin, A Scrupulous Monitor
Closes Shop, TIME, Oct. 6, 1980, at 70. See notes 22 & 32 infra.
20. Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38
MD. L. RE v. 673 (1979). See note 79 infra.
21. It illustrates character and what Gustafson calls "disposition." See notes 14-15
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story is a cynical story. If truth telling was a principle for Atticus,
his decision to protect Boo Radley was a decision against principle.
Either truth telling was for Atticus something more than a matter
of principle or the principle which directs truth telling was less im-
portant to Atticus than some other principle.22
Scout's account provides a contrast which shows that an anal-
ysis of competing principles is not adequate to explain what At-
ticus did. A few minutes before Atticus's decision to protect Boo
supra. Miss Lee said in 1964 that Atticus's "view of life was the heart of the novel." H.
FooT, supra note 1, at v. I make a similar argument with respect to Judge Horton. See
note 6 supra.
22. T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at ch. 9. With respect to Dean Freedman's argument
that lying is sometimes morally necessary for lawyers, see note 77 infra. The law of love as
Martin Luther analyzed it might defend Atticus's lie. J. GusTAFsON, supra note 14, at 114-
69. A similar argument is possible in Roman Catholic moral theology. I B. HARING, THE LAW
oF CHRIST 270-73. (1963) One way to fashion the argument would be to focus on moral
responsibility rather than the duty to tell the truth. A. JONSEN, RESPONSIBILITY IN MODERN
RELIGIOUS ETHIcs 124-25, 140 (1968); H.R. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963); H.R.
NIEBUHR, RADICAL MONOTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURE 78 (1960). Levinson, The Specious
Morality of the Law, HARPERS, May 1977, at 42, provides a useful analogy: "We no longer
care that Lincoln might have behaved most dubiously... because his memorable vision of
what this country was truly about, which involved transcending the existing constitutional
structure and its support for slavery, has prevailed and become part of our ordinary political
consciousness." Id. Herbert Fingarette, in a private communication, associated himself with
these schools of moral thought about truth telling:
I dissent ... when you say Atticus's decision to go along with the sheriff's lie was a
mistake. You say it was a mistake. You give no argument. I do not have a clear argu-
ment on the other side. But I do have two notions that may give the feel of where I
would go on the issue.
(1) You take "truth" and "lie" in what might be called a very literal way-but I
think it would be better to say: You wrongly treat the virtue of honesty and truthful-
ness in terms of an abstract principle to be understood as a logical universal. This
seems to me to be incompatible with the spirit of responding to particular human
beings, rather than living a moral life conceived ultimately in terms of abstract prin-
ciple. I do not think the view I'm pushing here is merely a casuistical device for not
noticing lies. Of course it is readily used this way, by any of us. But then all things
with the power of right are vulnerable to corruption in the service of evil.
(2) Related to this-this necessity to deal with persons as such, and not in terms
of abstractions-is the necessity to be humble, to realize that we cannot rely on logi-
cal formulae, and that in turn we may therefore cop out and rationalize a self-serving
act as one based on "moral intuition." Nevertheless, that's our dilemma. And At-
ticus's is that he, a man for whom truth is so central in existence as a human being, is
in this case-for reasons that may be obscure-doing right to forego "telling the
truth." It is his humbling burden. It would be so satisfying if he could live a life of
truthfulness by always telling the truth. No such luck. Truth is more mysterious.
Letter from Herbert Fingarette to Thomas Shaffer (Sept. 1980). It is not necessary for me to
dispute such compelling moral arguments here. I want instead to explore Atticus's behavior,
to see if I can learn what it is, even it is not self-deception or convention, that causes an
honest man to lie. See note 29 infra.
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Radley, at a time when only Sheriff Tate and Arthur Radley knew
who killed Ewell, Atticus thought that the sheriff's story was a con-
trivance to protect Jem; Atticus thought, at first, that it was Jem
who killed Ewell. (Jem was still unconscious.)
"Mr. Finch, Bob Ewell fell on his knife. He killed himself."
"Heck, if this thing's hushed up it'll be a simple denial to Jem
of the way I've tried to raise him. Sometimes I think I'm a total
failure as a parent, but I'm all they've got. Before Jem looks at
anyone else he looks at me, and I've tried to live so I can look
squarely back at him ... if I connived at something like this,
frankly I couldn't meet his eye, and the day I can't do that I'll
know I've lost him. I don't want to lose him and Scout, because
they're all I've got."
"Mr. Finch, Bob Ewell fell on his knife. I can prove it."
"Heck, can't you even try to see it my way? You've got chil-
dren of your own, but I'm older than you. When mine are grown
I'll be an old man if I'm still around, but right now I'm-if they
don't trust me they won't trust anybody. Jem and Scout know
what happened. If they hear of me saying down town something
different happened-Heck, I won't have them any more. I can't
live one way in town and another way in my home .... I won't
have it."
"God damn it, I'm not thinking of Jem!"
This comparison illustrates that Atticus joined in the lie (or as
Scout put it, decided not to kill the mockingbird) with struggle
and reluctance. If one focuses on the struggle it may be possible to
say that Atticus's willingness to lie for Boo Radley, and his refusal
to lie for Jem, were not so much decisions between principles as
they were proofs of his idea of himself, of his son, and of the com-
munity. If Atticus had been merely deciding between principles
which indicated inconsistent choices, he would have tipped the
balance for his son as readily as he tipped it for his reclusive
neighbor.
When Atticus refused to lie to protect Jem he felt that the
issue was whether he would, in some real way, cease to exist for his
son if he lied to protect him.2- "I couldn't meet his eye, and the
day I can't do that I'll know I've lost him." But when he joined in
the lie to protect Boo Radley he did not cease to exist; he became a
23. Buber would understand this literary point; relationships for him were ontological.
See note 17 supra.
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sharper, more memorable person-as a matter of literature, if
nothing else-both to Maycomb and to those of us who are in need
of lawyer heroes. The struggle illustrates how a person obeys the
"moral imperative" even when he makes a mistake (as his lie to
protect Boo Radley may have been). Obedience to the "moral im-
perative," to the impulse or the grace that tells us to do good and
avoid evil-that is, to take moral notions seriously-is what gives a
person identity.24 It is the moral act which made Atticus a person
rather than merely an individual. In this view, complicity in the
sheriff's lie was not an "antimoral" act. It was not an act which
disregarded the "moral imperative," but an act which showed how
much Atticus valued his ability to see the truth and to tell it, be-
cause he valued the truth so much that he would not lie to. protect
his son.
The struggle is an instance of how a person faces the "moral
imperative" in a confused and confusing world-how a hero is not
someone who understands every issue clearly but a person who is
able to deal with moral issues as if they mattered.25 Atticus's moral
heroism lies both in what he did and in his seeing that it was im-
portant to do right even if he ended up doing wrong. He decided
with doubt but with responsibility. 26 He became, in the Radley epi-
sode, a clearer and therefore a better person; the episode tells us
how a good man makes a doubtful choice-that more is involved
than whether the choice was sound in principle.27
This is not to say that Atticus's mistake in the Boo Radley
matter-if we are to regard it as a mistake (and I think we
should)-is unimportant. I do not argue that the moral life is
merely a matter of being conscientious. 28 The present claim is that
his moral mistake-assuming it is a mistake-does not diminish
24. See P. TELLcH, supra note 10. To Buber, moral means interpersonal, as it does in
most of Christian ethics. M. BuBml, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN (1965).
25. See P. TmLmCH, supra note 10. Tillich thus distinguishes between "immoral" and
"antimoral."
26. See A. JONSEN, REsPoNsBILrrY IN MODERN RELIGIOUS ETmICS (1968); H.R.
NiEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963); see also I B. HARING, THE LAW OF CHRIST 35-59
(1963); H.R. NIEBUHR, RADICAL MONOTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURE 36-38 (1960).
27. Such decisions are free, somewhat irrational, and influenced by faith. See, e.g.,
Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSPECTIVES BIOLOGY &
MED. 529 (1973).
28. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 9, at 93-194. But "[e]very effort to make a closed system
of Christian ethics stumbles finally on the richness and openness of Christian life." J. Gus-
TAFSON, supra note 14, at 99. "God, if you recall, did not warn his people against dirty
books. He warned them against high places." W. PERCY, LovE IN THE RUINS 64 (1971).
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him as a hero. His mistake makes his distinctness as a person more
vivid than it would be without the mistake. It makes him more
human-more like the rest of us-and it highlights his virtue so we
can study his virtue more clearly, and so the mistake itself be-
comes interesting." A mistake which occurs despite a person's
moral earnestness shows how life is for those who are morally ear-
nest. The mistake is, in this sense, inspiring and instructive. The
study of a life which is the product of more persistent delusion (as,
say, Albert Speer's"° was and Roger B. Taney's s1 may have been) is
also instructive, but the persistently deluded life does not stand
out from the culture in which it is lived; it only typifies its culture.
The hero stands out, and one reason he stands out is that his mis-
takes are made despite himself; his mistakes probe the culture.
The final point about mistakes in the life of a hero is that they
are ethically significant. The heroic life invites those who think
about ethics to discover the source of their own mistakes. The evil
in a life which is persistently deluded (Speer, again, or the S.S.
colonel in The Holocaust) is a grim warning; the mistakes in a
hero's life illustrate why we need heroes-in order to be inspired in
our study of virtue, not merely warned, so that we can find virtue
worthwhile and discover how a good person stumbles and, even
though he stumbles, remains a hero. 2
It remains for me to relate Atticus's character to his commu-
nity, to show how his behavior, including his behavior toward Boo
29. Interesting, that is, for a student of ethics. There is at least an analytical difference
between ethics and morals. J. GUSTAFSON, supra note 14, at 1-41, 115; P. TLLCH, supra note
10, at 22.
30. Hauerwas & Burrell, Self-Deception and Autobiography: Reflections on Speer's
Inside the Third Reich, in S. HAuERwAs, TRtuTHFULNEsS AND TRAGEDY 82 (1977).
31. B. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY (1922) (Greenwood Press ed. 1970). See
C. Carey, Roger Brooke Taney: The Story of a Lawyer's Conflicting Roles Between Honesty
and Faithfulness (1978) (unpublished paper, Notre Dame Law School).
32. My friend and colleague Professor Andrew W. McThenia provided this useful met-
aphor. It is also possible to see the "mistake" here as less a compromise with truthfulness
than a failure to regard Boo Radley as a person. Atticus did not, after all, ask Boo Radley
what he wanted to do; nor, for that matter, did he propose to consult Jem about what Jem
wanted to do. This point, which was suggested to me by Professor Robert A. Burt, is not
only a point about appropriate regard for other persons; it is a recognition of the fact that
the highest moral good I can wish for another is not that his decisions be right, but that he
(not I) make right decisions and that he thereby become more virtuous. See T. SHAFFER,
supra note 2, at 10-11. I think either "mistake" can be seen as a consequence of Atticus's
and Maycomb's commitment to the gentleman's ethic of benevolent protection of the weak,
including protection of the weak who aren't even weak. See notes 36-38 infra and accom-
panying text.
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Radley, is behavior in and for Maycomb. My claim is that Atticus's
behavior is illustrated by what he said to his sister: "This is our
home. We've made it this way for them, they might as well learn to
cope with it." Maycomb valued honesty; Atticus's expression of the
value of honesty was a supra-cultural devotion to telling the truth.
But his devotion was an expression of something he took from the
culture of Maycomb and offered back to it, and Maycomb, or at
least the moral leaders in Maycomb ("people with background," in
Miss Maudie's phrase), understood him.33 He is not a cosmic hero
bringing virtue out of Heaven. He is, rather, the sort of hero Jesus
was: he showed his neighbors what their values were;34 he showed
them the consequences of their values; and he showed them that
repentance meant telling the truth.3 5 His virtues are an insight into
what the values of Maycomb were and what they meant. He also
showed Maycomb how expensive its values were. Atticus's truth
telling was a specification in his own person of what General Lee
and the culture of Maycomb might have called honor-and of how
expensive honor is. Miss Maudie said this when she said, "We're
paying the highest tribute we can pay a man. We trust him to do
right."
That's one social side of the Boo Radley episode. The other
social side, the side General Lee stressed more clearly, is that
Maycomb values the protection of the weak. (Gavin Stevens of Jef-
ferson, Mississippi, admitted that he valued the protection of the
33. D. SHRIVER & K. OsTRoM, Is THERE HOPE FOR THE CITY? (1977), and Roof, Tradi-
tional Religion in Contemporary Society: A Theory of Local-Cosmopolitan Plausibility, 41
AM. Soc. REv. 195 (1976), make this point empirically. Buber argues that truth is known
only in relationships. M. BUBER, supra note 24. See D. BONHOEFFER, CREATION AND FALL 60-
61 (J. Fletcher & K. Downham trans. 1976) (the limits of life can be borne because of rela-
tionships); D. BONHOEFFER, ETHIcs 45-54 (N. Smith trans. 1955) (institutional guilt is deriv-
ative); H.R. NIEBUHR, supra note 16, at 64-77. Schudson makes a useful distinction between
"community" and "society," arguing, I think, that public morality is unlikely in what he
calls a modern society. Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The Correspon-
dence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 191 (1977).
34. K. BARTH, THE HUMANITY OF GOD 85-87 (T. Wieser & J. Thomas trans. 1960); K.
BARTH, THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN (D. Horton trans. 1978); R. SCHNACKEN-
BERG, THE MORAL TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT (1965).
35. See J. GusTAFSON, supra note 14, at 166-171, in which Kierkegard is discussed.
Reinhold Niebuhr said:
The power of God over man ... is recognized by the eyes of faith as the point where
the heavens are opened and the divine mystery is disclosed and the love of God to-
ward man shines down upon him; and man is no longer afraid, even though he knows
himself to be involved in the crucifixion.
Id. at 141.
[Vol. 42:181
MORAL THEOLOGY
weak who weren't even weak. 6) The two values are related; truth
is valued more when it protects the weak, and protection of the
weak is valued more when it tells the truth.3 7 Atticus said to Sher-
iff Tate that he would not accept the sheriff's lie if it were told to
protect Jem. The highest protection Atticus could give to his son
was to show him how to tell the truth, and then to care for him as
he endured the consequences of telling the truth. "I can't live one
way in town and another way in my home.""'
This is truthful protection of the weak. One way to test such a
generalization about Maycomb would be to ask how it provided
protection without truth and truth without protection. Whom did
it shelter with its lies? Whom did it leave naked to his enemies?
Protection without truth was what adult Maycomb (with the ex-
ception of Miss Maudie and, possibly, Judge Taylor) gave to
Mayella Ewell. It was also what adult Maycomb expected from At-
ticus when it tapped him to defend Tom Robinson. In one possible
analysis, Maycomb did not expect even a conventional defense. It
expected Atticus to be absent when the lynch mob came to the jail;
there was not to be any defense. Atticus was to protect his client
without telling or even seeming to know the truth (which means he
was not to protect him at all). Stevens described, in his account of
the Beauchamp case in Mississippi, how the burghers stood aside
for the lynch mob, but then stood ready to feed and shelter the
36. W. FAULKNER, THE TOWN 88-96 (Vintage ed. 1961). The moral alternative is not a
Darwinian jungle but a culture which provides protection when it is needed, as in the Niger-
ian custom that a man may return to his mother's family.
It's true that a child belongs to its father. But when a father beats his child, it seeks
sympathy in its mother's hut. A man belongs to his fatherland when things are good
and life is sweet. But when there is sorrow and bitterness he finds refuge in his
motherland. Your mother is always there to protect you. She is buried there. And
that is why we say that mother is supreme.
C. ACHEBE, THINGS FALL APART 138-39 (1959). See Elias, supra note 3, at 2-3, who argues
that Faulkner's answer to the delusions of patronage in the South was the vision (and impli-
cations) of "a society with a common purpose, common standards .. . a community...
responsible for the Negro's full freedom." Id.
37. See C. ACHEBE, supra note 36. The difference between Jefferson, Mississippi, and
Achebe's culture is that one has learned skills for finding out when protection is needed and
one has not. See J. GUSTAFSON, supra note 14, at 552; Elias, supra note 3.
38. Atticus here attacks an old and difficult tradition in Christian moral thinking, the
one Karl Barth calls "the syndrome of the two kingdoms." K. BARTH, EVANGELICAL THEOL-
oGY: AN INTRODUCTION (G. Foley trans. 1965). See D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 55-78 (N. Smith
trans. 1955); G. EBELING, LuTHEm AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS THOUGHT 175-91 (R. Wilson
trans. 1977); J. GUSTAFSON, supra note 14, at 120-30. Hauerwas and I argue that Robert
Bolt's Thomas Cromwell illustrates the evil in making a distinction between town and home.
See Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 11.
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lynch victim's family. "It proves again," he said, "how no man can
cause more grief than that one clinging blindly to the vices of his
ancestors.
'3 9
Atticus did not accept the dispensation from responsibility
which Maycomb offered him; he provided protection with truth
even though he knew that, in the end, his client would suffer as
much as, and maybe more than, he would have if Atticus had
stayed away from the jail or had been conventional.
But Atticus was also the child of Maycomb, even as he con-
fronted its conventions. He was capable of protection without
truth, too. His was a groping kind of heroism. "As you grow older,"
he told Jem, "you'll see white men cheat black men every day of
your life, but let me tell you something and don't you forget
it-whenever a white man does that to a black man, no matter who
he is, how rich he is, or how fine a family he comes from that white
man is trash .... There's nothing more sickening to me than a
low-grade white man who'll take advantage of a Negro's igno-
rance." Atticus, for all his righteous vehemence, missed the point.
The truth was that the social and economic system in Maycomb
made it impossible for black people to cope. The protection At-
ticus proposed for them was protection from the truth of their con-
tinued slavery. The real price which had to be paid was not black
rebellion at the white man's duplicity, but the price of freeing the
slaves-a price which is being paid now, sooner perhaps than Atti-
cus thought it would be, and toward a different result than Atticus
predicted. The truth was that black people needed the strength to
face and to deal by themselves with the "low-grade white man."
They no longer needed the protection of aristocrats.40 Atticus's
protection of them was patronage, a part of the Maycomb story,
and a part of the story Faulkner's Gavin Stevens tells about Jeffer-
son, Mississippi. Atticus did not offer to his black neighbors the
39. W. FAULKNER, INTRUDER IN THE DUST 49 (1948). This point is also made, with grim
clarity, in a much earlier Faulkner story. W. FAULKNER, Dry September, in COLLECTED STO-
RIES OF WILLIAM FAULKNER 169-83 (1934).
40. This was and is true of the elderly, for example, who are, in Galsworthy's phrase,
"at the mercy of care and love," J. GALSWORTHY, MAN OF PROPERTY 337 (Scribner ed. 1969);
of women, and particularly of women in the church, Herman, Loving Courtship or the Mar-
riage Market? The Ideal and Its Critics 1871-1911, 25 Am. Q. 235 (1973); and of black
people in the North. In R. STOUT, DOUBLE FOR DEATH (1939), a black servant is the most
proximate and most likely suspect, but the sleuths in the story-including one who says,
"I've never seen or heard anything yet that I wasn't curious about"-assume that the black
man is simple, loyal, and innocent; one detective even says, "We'll count Luke out on senti-
mental grounds."
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protection with truth which he offered his son Jem. The moral
leaders of Maycomb and of Jefferson were able to say, as Gavin
Stevens said, "[N]othing can hurt you if you refuse it; '4 1 but that
message was reserved for white gentlemen and their sons. Atticus's
choice with respect to Boo Radley, too, although it was an act of
high moral integrity and even an act which shows how deeply he
valued the truth, was a way of saying that Boo Radley needed pro-
tection from the truth, and not-as with Jem-protection with the
truth.42
Truth without protection also occurred in Maycomb. Atticus
was appointed to defend Robinson because the Supreme Court of
the United States had said, three years before, that courts such as
the Maycomb County Circuit Court could not deny lawyers to im-
poverished capital defendants. 3 Prior to that change, I suppose,
some black defendants in Judge Taylor's court had been left to
face the truth of their racist culture with little protection-as
black prisoners had been left to face the lynch mobs without the
protection of jailers. It is revealing, on this point, that the black
prisoner in Faulkner's account is saved not by a law enforcement
officer but by an eccentric old white woman who is recognized,
even by the mob, as the black prisoner's patron (because the black
man's mother-in-law had been the white woman's nanny)." The
lynch mob, even if it was a small and deviant part of the popula-
tion of Maycomb County, and of Yaknapatawpha County in the
Mississippi story, could function only because the respectable citi-
41. See note 36 supra. Wall Street lawyer culture deals with the issue differently but
also aristocratically. "Half the crooked things men do are done because they're afraid to be
disagreeable to their so-called 'pals.' Learn to hate the man who asks you to do a wrong
thing, Beeky. And then you'll find that your simple duty becomes your simple pleasure!" L.
AUCHINCLoss, THE PARTNERs 113 (1974).
42. Maimonides said, "The highest form of charity is not to give alms but to help the
poor to rehabilitate themselves." Posner, Charity: In the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature,
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA col. 343. See note 36 and 37 supra.
43. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
44. When Faulkner's Intruder was published, Edmund Wilson analyzed it as a "civil
rights" argument. He said Southern white patronage "appears in Faulkner's work as a force
more humane and more positive than almost anything else one can find in the work of even
those writers of our more mechanized society who have set out to defend human rights."
THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1948, at 120. Wilson has been criticized for assuming Gavin
Stevens's point of view is that of Faulkner. See J. BRYFR, supra note 3; Elias, supra note 3.
It is important to understand that a significant community delusion is bound to be attrac-
tive, even noble, and that telling the truth about it is a necessary base both for worthwhile
social ethics and for repentance-for being, in Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase, "completely
known and forgiven." J. GusTAFsON, supra note 14, at 141.
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zenry stood aside until the violence was over, and then provided
protection to black survivors.
Maycomb and Jefferson also provided a different and more
subtle sort of truth-without-protection to the innocent. Both towns
illustrate a cultural respect for the innocence and clearsightedness
of children, old white women, and "ignorant" black people; but the
culture of Maycomb and of Jefferson expected the innocent to
learn that their protection could not continue unless they accepted
or at least countenanced those delusions which supported the sub-
jection of black people. The difference between Scout and Atticus
is that Atticus had learned his way out of innocence. Scout's
account illustrates innocence and the loss of innocence in a scene
involving the children, who are sickened at the treatment they
have seen Tom Robinson receive on cross examination, and a
scruffy white farmer' named Dolphus Raymond. Raymond had
moved to the country, married a black woman, and fathered
mixed-race children. He had survived in Maycomb County, despite
this irregularity in his life, by pretending that he was a demented
alcoholic. In words Scout borrowed from one of her father's expla-
nations of the law, "[H]e deliberately perpetrated fraud against
himself." Raymond told the truth to the children (the truth being
that the beverage in his brown paper sack was Coca-Cola) "because
you're children and you can understand it." But then Raymond
saw that the children's friend Dill had been shattered and disillu-
sioned in the Maycomb County courtroom, and he said to Scout
and Jem, "Things haven't caught up with that one's instinct yet.
Let him get a little older and he won't get sick and cry. Maybe
things'll strike him as being-not quite right, say, but he won't cry,
not when he gets a few years on him." That-of the children as of
the mock alcoholic Dolphus Raymond-is truth without
protection.45
Protection without truth and truth without protection are re-
45. See note 40 supra. Tom Stoppard, defending his literary claim that public morals
are private morals, said:
People are so clever that, paradoxically, they can be persuaded of almost anything.
For example, if one were to say to an intelligent child the following: 'Life in East
Germany is very agreeable, and there's a wall around it to keep people in' the child
would say, 'There's something wrong here.' But if you said it to a professor of politi-
cal science or of political history, you'd have a much better chance of persuading him
that what you said isn't nonsensical.
Henninger, Theater: Tom Stoddard and the Politics of Morality, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1980,
at 17, col. 1.
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solved either in delusion (the assumption that black people are
wrong in and lie about their encounters with white people) or in
violence (the lynch mobs, the killing of Tom Robinson). Protection
with truth depends, in that culture or in any other, on heroes such
as Atticus who are no longer innocent but still truthful, who are
able to see the culture's delusions, as Atticus often did, but who
are also implicated in the culture's delusions. Atticus was more
ironic than either pathetic or tragic: he was not pathetic because
he was noble; if he were not noble he would be somebody else. He
was not tragic, either, because the fates he encountered were fates
in which he held membership; he was, in and of Maycomb, his own
fate."' Atticus was patronizing toward black people, and he could
rail against the spectral North as much as any Alabama country
lawyer who ever saw advantage in doing so; but he risked every-
thing in order to tell the truth, and would not allow an innocent lie
to protect his son. The point is not to see Atticus as less than a
hero, but to see him as a real hero. A real hero is best studied when
he is among his neighbors, bearing moral witness to them but also
suffering among them, suffering even by believing the delusions
they believe. This is an important point for us American lawyers.
Our profession tends to insist on a hagiography of purified lawyers
rather than the sobering study of legitimate lawyer-heroes. 47 As a
result we have suffered more cynicism than we need to have suf-
fered. We have not learned where to find our heroes or what to do
with them. We have not learned that our heroes are among us, and
always have been, and that the moral failures of an honest, brave
person are ethically important.
In the last scene in Scout's account, Atticus struggled with an
example of truth telling so pristine that he was willing to see pain
come to his broken, bedridden, teen-aged son rather than tell a lie;
he saw protection of the weak so pristine that it seemed to demand
from him surrender of his honesty. His resolution of the dilemma
46. See R. NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1952). .
47. Graham Greene notices that people who lack prejudices also lack ideals. G.
GREENE, THE HUMAN FACTOR 112 (1979). There is a tendency in American law reform to
suppose that anyone who makes money cannot be a reformer, let alone a hero. See, e.g.,
Neely, Your Moral Obligation To Make Money, Juius DOCTOR, Feb.-Mar. 1979, at 46. The
use of biography as theology is a search for legitimate heroes who have prejudices and who
may make money. See J. MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY 170-203 (1974); see also
Schudson's discussion of the views of Louis D. Brandeis. Schudson, Public, Private, and
Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 191, 210-11 (1977).
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expresses devotion to both of these values, both of which he
learned from his family and his neighbors. In an odd, sad way, he
honored both values in what he did. In a sense which "people with
background" in Maycomb no doubt understood, he compromised
neither truthfulness nor care. But, to understand that, one has to
understand first where Atticus came from and where he was, and
how much it meant to him to be where he was. It is this cultural
quality, taken with his nobility, which gives "ultimate serious-
ness"48 to what he did, and which made the outcome of the Boo
Radley incident a part of Atticus's personality and a part of his
hope for Maycomb.
II. TELLING THE TRUTH AS COURAGE
.A hero's truth telling seems to involve courage at two points-in
seeking truth, and in facing the truth when it is found. The exam-
ple of courage that Atticus related to his children is Mrs. Dubose's
unpromising confrontation with her morphine addiction. Atticus
told his children the ill-tempered, bigoted old woman was the
bravest person he ever knew. There must have come a time when
Mrs. Dubose discovered that her physician, in an effort to ease the
pain of her terminal illness, had been giving her morphine. If Scout
had described that time, we might have asked why Mrs. Dubose
had to be told, or why she had wanted to discover the truth of her
addiction. Truth hurts; it is not frivolous to wonder whether it
would be better at times not to know, and not want to know, the
truth. The courage with which a hero refuses to be deceived is the
courage of a person who wants to know the truth, even when the
truth is ugly and destructive.
It also takes courage to face the truth once it is known. Truth
is often so destructive that we can understand a person's seeking
to evade what he knows. That is what Maycomb-including Mrs.
Dubose-did with the truth about Mayella Ewell. Those who ob-
jected to Atticus's defense of Tom Robinson contended, plausibly,
that Atticus would cause great harm, and no apparent good, in
publicly insisting that Mayella Ewell tried to seduce a black man.
Two years before the Robinson trial, in Decatur, Alabama, when
Judge James Edwin Horton overturned a verdict of guilty in an-
other rape case, that part of the state was so upset that five lynch-
48. See P. TILLICH, supra note 10.
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ings of black prisoners were attributed to Horton's ruling.49 The
black defendant in Horton's case, Haywood Patterson, was tried
again (before a different judge) and sentenced to death. Judge
Horton's telling the truth gained no more for Haywood Patterson
than Atticus's telling the truth gained for Tom Robinson. The Boo
Radley incident also illustrates that Atticus knew how the truth
could cause harm without evident benefit. It takes courage to
choose to face the consequences of the truth being told, as it takes
courage to want to learn the truth in the first place.
Courage in these instances seems to involve both bravery and
a point of view. Mrs. Dubose's courage involved both; there was a
reason behind her wish to be "beholden to nothing and nobody." A
point of view provides the hero with a reason-an intellectual de-
fense-for seeking and telling the truth. Bravery without a point of
view doesn't seem to have a way to esteem truth more than it es-
teems benign falsehood. (Esteem for benign falsehood is illustrated
by Atticus's behavior toward Boo Radley.) Bravery alone would
not explain Atticus Finch, who was brave but who lived not so
much by bravery as by telling the truth-or, rather, who lived by
knowing5" the truth with courage, and who therefore sought the
truth and told the truth. Atticus's courage depended upon a point
of view. His point of view is what I call his moral theology. My
claim is that his skill in being a hero and a truth teller-that is, his
practice of courage as a virtue-was present in his point of view
before it became present in his bravery.
Atticus gave three reasons for his decision to tell the truth in
the defense of Tom Robinson:
(1) "If I didn't I couldn't hold up my head in town, I couldn't
represent this county in the legislature, I couldn't even tell you or
Jem not to do something ... ." I have discussed that aspect of
the story in explaining that Atticus cannot be understood apart
from Maycomb. I shall return to this reason again to explain At-
ticus's courage as political and as professional.
(2) "Do you think I could face my children otherwise? . .. I
49. See H. PATTERSON & E. CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO Boy (1973).
50. The Book of Job invites meditation in this regard. Herbert Fingarette says that
Job can be explained as having integrity-wholeness-and the ability to face the truth in
suffering. See Fingarett, The Meaning of Law in the Book of Job, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 1581
(1978). Karl Barth contends that the biblical figure is not so much a hero as one who testi-
fies to sickness. See K. BARTH, THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN 77-79 (D. Horton
trans. 1978).
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hope and pray I can get Jem and Scout through it without bitter-
ness, and most of all without catching Maycomb's usual disease."
This reason explains Atticus's two ways of protecting the weak; it
appears, in reprise, toward the end of the account, when he ex-
plained that he must train Jem (but not Boo Radley) to face (and
endure) the truth. This reason illustrates that nothing can hurt a
gentleman so long as he can refuse it. 1
(3) "This case, Tom Robinson's case, is something that goes to
the essence of a man's conscience-Scout, I couldn't go to church
and worship God if I didn't try to help that man. . . before I can
live with other folks I've got to live with myself." (Scout added
that Atticus "liked to be by himself in church.") This reason is
expressly theological; it claims an intellectual grounding for the
way Atticus practiced law in the relationships between Atticus and
God; it can be understood as drawing on the Christian heritage
which Atticus had, through being a descendant of the stubborn
Methodist 6migr6 Simon Finch (who left Cornwall because he was
afraid of being corrupted by it), and it draws on Atticus's sense of
himself as a Southern Protestant Christian, and a citizen of a town
which was less pluralist than other towns in America were in 1935
and more explicitly Christian in its culture than any town in
America is now. 52
The Christian theology of Maycomb had two branches, white
and black. Scout described the white branch mainly in social
terms; she did not connect Atticus's private faith with such things
as meetings of the women in his church. Nevertheless, there were
connections; part of Miss Maudie's plain-spoken defense of At-
ticus, for instance, occurred at a meeting of the white Methodist
missionary circle. The heroism Atticus represents-the semi-gov-
ernmental heroism of a lawyer and a gentleman-is explained
without elaborate reference to theology, even though it is evident
that a theology is present and is important.
The other branch of Maycomb's Christian theology is the
black church. Scout tells of the day she and Jem accompanied
their surrogate mother Calpurnia to the Sunday worship services
of the black church in Maycomb; she also describes how Rev.
Sykes, the pastor of that church, led the black people of the town
51. See Vickery, Gavin Stevens: From Rhetoric to Dialectic, 2 FAULKNER STUDIES 1,
151, 206, 210 (1953).
52. See M. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 133-
43, 210-20 (1970).
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as they watched Tom Robinson's trial-Rev. Sykes leading the
black Christians, Atticus standing in for the white Christians.
These stories help to explain how Alabama's black churches could
have been the birthplace of the civil rights movement twenty years
later. They were the least racist places in America, but they were
also rallying centers for the spirit and patience of black
Southerners. They were the source of what Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., described with Christian religious symbolism.5 3 Their
faithful commitment to and celebration of the religious symbol of
reconciliation, of the story of Moses (exodus from slavery), and of
the "revolutionary subordination" of Jesus Christ (suffering
servanthood), and their sense-which the white church in the
South has always shared-of God's acting in the world, gave
Maycomb a point of view. That is the importance of Atticus's theo-
logical reason for defending Tom Robinson by telling the truth; it
evidences Maycomb's point of view. It was doubtless an important
part of Atticus's definition of himself and of his community. I sug-
gest that it is the intellectual content in his courage.
The principal symbol for Christians is the Cross.55 In the
Cross the separated church in Maycomb was united. To the extent
it was not united in the Cross, it was not the church.56 All of the
other symbols-suffering servanthood (which can be found both in
slavery and in General Lee's description of the gentleman), exodus,
and reconciliation-are gathered together under the Cross.57 The
53. J. MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY 65-86 (1974). McClendon argues that the
Christian hero will usually experience a confrontation with Jesus, Id. at 170-203. The black
church provided confrontations for Atticus, for Maycomb, and for Dr. King's Alabama. Such
confrontations in Mockingbird, though, are mostly off stage.
54. Id. at 112-39. See K. BARTH, THE FAITH OF THE CHURCH 43-52 (G. Vananian trans.
1958).
55. See J. MCCLENDON, supra note 53, at 87-92; J. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS
(1972).
56. Unbar the door! unbar the door!
We are not here to triumph by fighting, by stratagem, or by resistance,
Not to fight with beasts as men. We have fought the beast
And have conquered. We have only to conquer
Now, by suffering. This is the easier victory.
Now is the triumph of the Cross ....
T. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 71-72 (1935).
"I didn't go to religion to make me happy. I always knew a bottle of Port would do that.
If you want a religion to make you feel really comfortable, I certainly don't recommend
Christianity." C. LEwIs, GOD m THE DOCK 58 (1970). See H. THIELICKE, CHRIST AND THE
MEANING OF LIE 39, 61 (J. Doberstein trans. 1962); Barry, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 629,
643, 648-50 (1977) (reviewing C. FIrD, RIGHT AND WRONG).
57. See, e.g., MCCLENDON supra note 53, at 39-64 for a description of the theology in
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Cross says to Christians who wonder whether they should seek and
tell the truth, "[H]e that doeth the truth cometh to the light, that
his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. ' ' 58
The God of the Cross is, in two words, love and sovereign: Love
triumphs; one need not fear the truth.59 The symbol of the Cross
carries with it all of the ugliness of Mrs. Dubose's addiction and
disease, and all of the hopelessness of Tom Robinson's having to
suffer because of what people do to one another in the name of the
law. But those who are gathered together under the Cross can deal
with the truth because the Cross points beyond itself to triumph,
to the open tomb on Easter.60 "Long live God," as the chorus sings
in Godspell. Christian appeal to the Cross as a dominant symbol
for the church-and thus to the symbols implicit in the Cross, of
reconciliation, exodus, and suffering servanthood-provided At-
ticus a point of view which said that he and Maycomb could bear
the truth. It is important to search for Atticus's (and thereby for
Maycomb's) point of view because bravery alone cannot explain
what he did; his courage depended upon a direction and purpose
aside from bravery. One does not talk about the courage of those
who joined the lynch mob.
I identify this theology of Cross, reconciliation, suffering
servanthood, and exodus as the most likely in this case; it is a more
likely explanation of the substantive side of Atticus's courage than
a classically tragic view of his situation would be. Atticus is more
likely to have seen himself as in the hands of God than as an an-
tagonist of the gods. 1 The Christian theological point of view is
more likely to have been what he drew from his family and his
the life of Dag Hammarskjold.
58. John 3:21.
59. See Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 11. See also Hauerwas, Jesus: The Story of
the Kingdom, 26 THEOLOGY TODAY 303 (1978). Karl Barth's discussion of the point evi-
dences the openness and trust in a theology that is sometimes described as gloomy and
Calvinistic. Conscience, Barth says, causes one to know a will which is "straight and pure,
and which, when it once prevails, must have other, wholly other, issues than these we see
today." K. BARTH, supra note 50, at 13. The enemies from whom God will save us, he says,
include those we create with our disobedience. K. BARTH, THE GREAT PROMISE 68 (H.
Freund trans. 1963).
60. K. BARTH, DOoATICS IN OUTLINE, 101-07 (G. Thompson trans. 1959). The suffer-
ing is legally caused and the triumph a triumph over the law. Barth even says that Jesus
triumphs over Pilate because Pilate does God's will. Id. at 108-13.
61. "What lies ahead in the future is open worthy of trust." J. GusTAsON supra note
14, at 252. Gustafson, discussing Gabriel Marcel, argues that capitulation to fate (and, I
suppose, defiance of fate) is the opposite of hope. Id. at 160. See J. ELLUL, THE PRESENCE OF
THE KINGDOM (0. Wyon trans. 1967); H.R. NmuHR, supra note 16, at 38-48.
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neighbors, what he held up to them when he insisted on the truth
and on the cost of holding to the values Maycomb held. I argue
this as the most likely inference from the history and ethos of that
time and place; I argue it also in a confessional way-that is, as
one who understands that the Christian point of view is adequate
to explain Atticus's commitment to truth-but I don't doubt that
other points of view might have been adequate. Atticus is a Chris-
tian hero as a matter of fact, and he should be studied as a Chris-
tian hero if one proposes to learn from him about the virtue of
courage. My argument is that a hero cannot be studied usefully
when his faith is ignored.
This intellectual side of Atticus's courage has implications
from and for his community. The community or social side here is
that Atticus's courage-his theology, from which he knew that he
need not fear to seek and to state the truth, and his brav-
ery-made it possible for him to see the truth where his neighbors
had learned not to see the truth. Communities carry their heroes'
point of view, but communities also deceive themselves and train
their young in the skills of self-deception. "Things haven't caught
up with that one's instinct yet," said Dolphus Raymond about Dill
outside the Maycomb courthouse. "Let him get a little older and
he won't get sick and cry." Maycomb, doubtless, had conventional
explanations for the subjection of black people; Scout spares us the
discomfort of reading them, probably because we all know what
they were. Its conventional explanations not only had hidden the
real reasons but also had hidden the fact that real reasons were
hidden. The community had made this process of "reduplication"
a habit and then a policy.62 What this cultural development meant,
finally, was that Maycomb had to shape a world which was consis-
tent with its policy; it had to proclaim its policy as a virtue and to
exact commitments-moral commitments-from its citizens, both
to protect its untruthfulness and to give itself order, to explain its
history and a way of life which it had come to consider, for the
wrong reasons, as valuable and fragile.
The arresting thing about this insight into Maycomb's collec-
tive delusions, and into our own, is that people of integrity are
more vulnerable to cultural delusion than are scoundrels and hy-
pocrites.63 Cultural delusions are the delusions of our leaders, espe-
62. See Hauerwas & Burrell, supra note 30, at 86-88, which builds on the insights of
H. FINGAREI , SELF-DECEPTION (1969).
63. See Hauerwas & Burrell, supra note 30, at 87. It is moral man, Barth says, who
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cially of our moral leaders. That is why the missionary circle
sounds so ugly in Scout's story; it is why Jesus is so hard on the
Pharisees. A community moves away from its delusions, if it ever
does, when one of its own seeks and tells the truth more clearly
than is usual, and is willing to contemplate the price he and the
community will pay for telling the truth. Among other things, this
means that he seizes upon something in the community's theology
which will allow him to describe the community-and himself in
the community-in a way that is more truthful than the conven-
tional descriptions of the community. Characteristically, this new
"master image" is uncomfortable because it demands a relatively
clear look into what the community is doing. It gives the commu-
nity a relatively new way of looking at itself, ordering itself, and
explaining its past." (An example is the Letter to the Hebrew
Christians, in the New Testament.) While this new look invites the
community to accept responsibility for the truth (which is what
"repentance" means), it also has an understanding of, and a com-
passion for, the community which permits the community to go on
being a community; it is purifying rather than destructive.6 5 In ref-
erence to places such as Maycomb and Jefferson, Mississippi, the
prophets of the culture (prophets as different from one another as
Faulkner and King) tended to believe that the black Southerner
would succeed in the twentieth century where the white North-
erner had failed in the nineteenth. This painful but ultimately be-
nign social effect ensues because the truth-telling hero comes from
the community and suffers as it suffers, and because he is flawed,
as the community, before, during, and after its awakening, is
flawed. The hero says, "I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in
the midst of a people of unclean lips .... Here am I; send me." '
Ill. TELLING THE TRUTH AS POLITICAL
Atticus told the truth to Maycomb and for the benefit of
Maycomb. I argued in Part I that his reverence for truth and his
makes us ashamed of men. K. BARTH, supra note 50, at 147.
64. See K. BARTH, THE FAITH OF THE CHURCH (G. Vananian trans. 1958); J. MCCLEN-
DON, supra note 53.
65. General Lee, after the war, practiced this sort of reconciliation. F. GAINES, LEE:
THE FINAL ACHIEVEMENT (1978). See Hauerwas, Jesus: The Story of the Kingdom, 26 THE-
OLOGY TODAY 303 (1978). It is in hope for such personal and heroic moral witness that a
society can be talked about as "self-transcending." H.R. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF
87-88 (1963).
66. Isaiah 6:5,8.
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gentleman's or "republican" sense of public responsibility were
learned from his neighbors and his family. I argued in Part II that
the courage which caused him to see the truth, and then to tell it,
depended on what he had learned in the church and on a theology
which he shared with Maycomb, to which he could appeal in a way
Maycomb understood. I now make a third argument: Atticus's tell-
ing of the truth was political as well as social. I say this because
the morals of Maycomb as a "state 'e7 depended on the morals of
persons; because the secular tradition of Atticus's leadership as a
lawyer, legislator and gentleman identify public and private
morals;'$ and, finally, because Maycomb had unwittingly commis-
sioned him to tell it the truth, or at least to try, and thereby to free
the town from its delusions. From these three indications of truth-
telling as political, my conclusions are that Atticus, although he
exceeded his priestly 9 commission, nonetheless remained faithful
to Maycomb, and that his actions were theological in their politics
and political in their theology.
A. Source of Public Morals
Public morals in Maycomb were the morals of specific persons.70
Sheriff Tate knew that it was up to him (and, he insisted, him
alone) whether the death of Robert Ewell was to be officially ac-
counted for with a lie. He decided as he did because he believed
that to tell the truth would be a sin; his position on that issue was
the position of Maycomb. (Atticus's behavior can be accounted
for-although not adequately-on the ground that Atticus knew
67. I use Jacque Maritain's distinction between "state" and "community." See J.
MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951).
68. See note 79 infra.
69. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE ch. 1 (1977),
explains this secular use of "priestly" to describe American lawyers; it is usually attributed
to Toqueville.
70. Tom Stoppard's character, Pavel Hollar, says: "The ethics of the State must be
judged against the fundamental ethic of the individual.... The human being, not the citi-
zen. I conclude there is an obligation, a human responsibility, to fight against State correct-
ness. Unfortunately, that is not a safe conclusion." Henninger, Theater: Tom Stoppard and
the Politics of Morality, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1980, at 17, col. 1. Martin Buber argued that
one must know a thou before one can know a we, and that all morality is interpersonal. See
K. BARTH, supra note 50, at 273; Friedman, Introduction to M. BuBER, THn KNOWLEDGE OF
MAN (1965). Bonhoeffer said that the problem of the Pharisee was his need for order, which
took precedence over persons and therefore over morals. D. BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 142-76 (N.
Smith trans. 1955). See generally J. HARTT, A CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIAN CULTURE (1967), for
an argument that the church cannot be the church when it allows itself to become a
subculture.
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that and knew he could do nothing about it.) Persons were the
source of public morals in Maycomb; if it ran a risk-and it
did-the risk was the tyranny of tyrants, not the tyranny of "value
free" experts.7 1 It could afford the risk of tyranny because it had
not yet become a pluralistic society; it still had a common source of
thinking about morals (a theology, I think) and was able to have,
as a pluralistic society cannot, the notion that there is a common
good.7 2 These facts have a number of implications, implications
which can be generalized by noting that in Maycomb private
morals were the source of public morals; the town understood and
believed, as Atticus did, that there was not one set of morals for
official life and another set for life at home. (The moral consensus
included significant moral delusions.) A leader there-whether he
wielded authority formally, as the sheriff did, or informally, as At-
ticus did-could not escape from the public and even official bur-
den of his relationships; he could only choose whether or not to be
responsible in his relationships. (The patronage system for taking
care of Boo Radley, the elderly, black people and women is an am-
71. "When I was in power," John Updike's Felix Ellellou, a fallen tyrant, says, "I
found that experts can't be trusted. For this simple reason: unlike tyrants, they are under
no delusion that a country, a people, is their body. Under this delusion a tyrant takes every-
thing personally. An expert takes nothing personally. Nothing is ever precisely his fault." J.
UPDIKE, THE Coup 280 (1978). LeCarre's George Smiley says: "I think it safer to stay with
institutions .... In that way we are spared the embarrassment of personalities. After all,
that's what institutions are for, isn't it?" J. LECARRE, THE HONOURABLE SCHOOLBOY 53 (Ban-
tam ed. 1977). But in old age Smiley says, "I invested my life in institutions.., and all I
am left with is myself." J. LECARRE, SMInxy's PEOPLE 152 (1980). Poets are more vivid on
this point than theologians, but see W. Kaufmann's note in M. BUBER, I AND THOU 65
(1972); M. NoVAK, IN PRAIsa OF CYNIciSM 15-17 (1975); A. MacIntyre, Patients as Agents, in
PHLOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITs NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 197-212 (S. Spicker & H.
Engelhardt eds. 1977); Sobran, Zigging, Zagging Morality, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1979, at
A.19, col. 1.
72. "Society," George Smiley said, "is an association of minorities." J. LECARRE,
SMIue'S PEOPLE 88 (1980). See H.R. Niebuhr's argument that pluralism is henotheistic.
H.R. NmmuHR, supra note 16, at 75. Professor Geoffrey Hazard laments the loneliness of the
modem American lawyer. Hazard, Conscience and Circumstance in Legal-Ethics, in 1 So-
CIAL RESPONSBILITY: JOURNALisM, LAw, MEDicmE 42-44 (L. Hodges ed. 1975), but defends
the adversary ethic on the ground that it supports autonomy and privacy. G. HAZARD, ETH-
ICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 120-35 (1978). Hauerwas argues that pluralism cannot nourish
the common good. S. HAuERwAs, supra note 9, at 222-40. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., argues to the
contrary, but he can also be interpreted as saying that modern American culture is less
pluralistic than it (or Hauerwas) thinks. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom and the Christian
Civil Magistrate, 8 CAP. U.L. Ray. 413 (1979). Compare Hauerwas's discussion of John How-
ard Yoder's theory of how the church influences secular values: "[B]y osmosis . . . moral
values are slowly accepted by the world at large even though it has no basis for such a
commitment." HAUFRwAs, supra note 9, at 212.
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biguous example.") Justice, if anyone in Maycomb had bothered
to describe it, would have been described as an interpersonal vir-
tue. The failure to provide justice (across the back fence or in the
courthouse) would have been described, as I think Dolphus Ray-
mond did describe it, as an interpersonal failure. This state of af-
fairs is a promising, if not necessary, condition for political moral
witness; that is, whether or not the public morals of a community
always are individual, this was the case in Maycomb, and therefore
it was possible in Maycomb to confront each citizen with the moral
failing of the community-to confront him as if that failing were
his own.74
B. Secular Tradition
Atticus was apparently as much a Jeffersonian as was General Lee.
He saw the rectitude of his society, and specifically the rectitude of
its government, as his responsibility. He exercised responsibility in
every direction: for the reclusive Boo Radley (who lived with his
parents); for a dying old woman (who was implacably independent,
well provided for, and in the care of a competent servant); for the
Robinson family (who suffered at Robert Ewell's hands after Tom
Robinson was taken to prison); and for anyone who might encoun-
ter a mad dog in the public street. The considerations he took with
him to the legislature were those he took to court and those he
took to his home and from it.75 The difference in his treatment of
Jem and Boo Radley (on the truth of who killed Ewell) was, in this
sense, not attributable to Jem's being his son so much as to Jem
being in training to assume Atticus's duties. This tradition speaks,
as General Lee did, to a moral way to use power and advantage; it
explains the patronage out of which Atticus sought to protect cate-
gories of weak people, whether they were weak or not;7 6 it also
73. See note 40 supra.
74. T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at ch. 13.
75. About half of Judge George Sharswood's essay on legal ethics-the source of mod-
ern codified American legal ethics-is an admonition to legislators not to trifle with prop-
erty rights. This emphasis may not implicitly respect the identity of public and private
morals, but it implies the identity of law office morals and legislator's morals. G. SHARs-
WOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Philadelphia 1854), reprinted in 32 REP. A.B.A. 9
(1907). Bloomfield argues that Sharswood was not a republican. Bloomfield, supra note 20.
76. Simon Finch, a British Methodist 6migr6 who came to Alabama to avoid corrup-
tion, would perhaps have understood the blend of Jeffersonian aristocracy and Christian
suffering servanthood that I find in General Lees admonition to gentlemen and in Atticus's
care for the insufferable Mrs. Dubose. John Wesley said:
Thy neighbor,. . . every child of man... not excepting him whom thou lmowest to
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explains his identification of public and private morality ("I can't
live one way in town and another way in my home"). Atticus would
probably have agreed with the quaint, disappearing breed of Amer-
ican lawyers who refuse their profession's claim of dispensation
from public responsibility." Atticus would not have lied for a cli-
ent or have helped a client to lie;78 he might not even have agreed
to argue the innocence of a dangerous criminal. Twentieth century
lawyers assume that their profession has always been relieved of
responsibility for those whom the adversary system leaves free to
harm others; that is not the case, and my guess is that Atticus
would stand with the old-fashioned "republicans" on the ques-
tion.79 Thus, Atticus's insistence on the truth in court was not sig-
nificantly different from his insistence on the truth in answers to
the questions of children. He believed that the government of
Maycomb should know and tell the truth because he was aware
that a gentleman is a governor, but not aware that he was, as gov-
ernor, a different person than he was at home or when he sat by
himself in church.80
be evil and unthankful, him that still despitefully uses and persecutes thee: him thou
shalt love as thyself, with the same invariable thirst after his happiness in every kind;
the same unwearied care to screen him from whatever might grieve or hurt either his
soul or body.
H. CARTER, THE METHODIsT HERITAGE 202 (1950).
77. The idea that professionals claim circumstantial dispensation from responsibility
is attributable to Hauerwas. See S. HAUERwAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY 195-97 (1977);
see also Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1
(1975). The charge against lawyers is also suggested in S. HAUERWAS, supra note 9, at 48-89,
and H.R. NmuHR, THE RESPONSmLE SELF 17-18, 33-36 (1963). The dispensation is claimed
and defended in M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETmIcs IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
78. See notes 107-08 infra.
79. See Bloomfield, supra note 20; M. Silver, David Hoffman and the Rationalization
of Legal Study (1979) (unpublished paper, University of Chicago Law School). The proto-
type on which Bloomfield and Silver rely is D. HOFFMAN, Professional Deportment, in A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (Baltimore 1817). The article was revised and expanded in a two-
volume edition of A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY published in 1836. The latter article is the
source of Hoffman's Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment. In my view, much
of this "republicanism" survives in Sharswood's essay, see G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 75,
but Bloomfield does not agree with me. Wherever one places the change in American legal
ethics, from the morals of public responsibility to the morals of client loyalty, it was estab-
lished by the 1870's when modem bar associations were organized. Schudson, Public, Pri-
vate, and Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel
Bowles, 21 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 191 (1977).
80. See note 38 supra.
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C. Community Commission
Miss Maudie's argument that Atticus, in telling the truth and in
his bravery, acted for the community ("we've got Atticus to go for
us . . . we trust him to do right") suggests that he acted with a
moral commission which was parallel to his commission as court-
appointed defender of Tom Robinson, sheriff's sharpshooter, and
member of the legislature. That moral commission was a commis-
sion to tell the truth; Miss Maudie's words were a defense of At-
ticus after the trial, a defense to the charge that he should not
have brought out the truth about Mayella Ewell. For two reasons,
a community needs to commission someone to tell it the truth.
First, otherwise its people will not be free; none of them will be
free. In a society which continues to believe its lies about itself, the
governor who markets untruth is as much a prisoner as the citizen
who hears untruth."" Such a society either dies or manages some-
how to find a prophet.82 Second, since a society defines itself,
through its state, by identifying and in some way excluding the
law-breakers who live in it, the premises on which "the administra-
tion of justice" rests must be seen to be relatively open, honest
premises; 3 if not, no one is safe; everyone is in the situation of the
accused in a novel by Kafka.
Incidentally, the commission of which Miss Maudie spoke-
like the Jeffersonian tradition which General Lee honored-
seemed to limit Atticus's choices. Atticus could not have dissoci-
ated himself from his community's treachery. He could not have
renounced it as, say, Don Quixote renounced the pain in his com-
munity or Camus's Jean-Baptiste, the "judge penitent" of The
Fall-a lawyer, by the way-turned away from the pain of others
in an effort to deal only with his own evil."
81. [Varro] indicates that he does not publish all things, because they would not
only have been contemptible to himself, but would have- seemed despicable even to
the rabble, unless they had been passed over in silence. I should be thought to conjec-
ture these things, unless he himself... had openly said ... that many things are
true which it is not only not useful for the common people to know, but that it is
expedient that the people should think otherwise, even though falsely .... In this
he no doubt expresses the policy of the so-called wise men by whom states and peo-
ples are ruled. Yet by this crafty device the malign demons are wonderfully delighted,
who possess alike the deceivers and the deceived ....
ST. AUGusTNE, THE Crry OF GOD bk. IV, ch. 31 (Modem Lib. ed. M. Dods trans. 1950).
82. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at ch. 10.
83. Id. at ch. 13.
84. See H. FiNGARmE , SELF-DEc EPTON 57-65, 140-44 (1969); E. BUSCH, KARL BARTH:
His LiwE FROM LnsrEns AND AUTOBIOGRAPmcAL TEXTs 226-43, 257, 261, 273, 358 (J. Bowden
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D. Faithfulness
The most plausible charges against Atticus were charges of disloy-
alty. Similar charges were made against Gavin Stevens in Jefferson
and against Judge Horton in Decatur. Those charges are part of a
curious phenomenon in the lives of truth tellers as they act politi-
cally. They are curious because the charges of disloyalty are plausi-
ble; Gavin Stevens did--despite himself-exonerate a black man
whom white men charged with the murder of a white man; Atticus
and Judge Horton did show what the press in the North and what
the communists said was true-an Alabama criminal jury in 1933
or 1935 could not fairly try a black man accused of raping a white
woman. All three of these lawyer-heroes brought pain to their com-
munities. They were all disloyal-and loyalty is important to a
community's survival. Jesus was disloyal to the embattled, occu-
pied people of Judea. His actions made them vulnerable to dis-
order and thereby to repression from the Romans. It really was
"expedient... that one man should die for the people, and that
the whole nation perish not,"85 as it was expedient for Judge Hor-
ton to lose office and Stevens and Finch to be ineffective in their
defenses of black men. The phenomenon of disloyalty by truth tell-
ers requires at least that we find another word-I have suggested
"faithfulness" 5 8-for the lawyer-hero, prophet, or savior whose dis-
loyalty threatens the community which hears the truth.
trans. 1976); S. HAUERwAS, supra note 9, at 241-60. When he sees what Jefferson, Missis-
sippi, wants either to do or to allow to be done to Lucas Beauchamp, Faulkner's Chick
Mallison longs to get on his horse and leave the community, but he does not leave. He
learns instead to remain and struggle and, as his uncle says, to refuse the evil. Thus Chick
learns from his uncle, and from his community, both conscience and consciousness. See
Elias, supra note 3.
85. John 11:50.
86. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at ch. 8. M. BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 86
(1965), suggests that faithfulness-as, perhaps, distinguished from loyalty-turns on the
truth. See also K. BARTH, EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY 146-47 (G. Foley tras. 1965), on God's
attitude toward His people as the model of faithfulness (but hardly of loyalty). The biblical
concept of faithfulness implies endurance and trust, J. GUILLET, THEMES OF THE BIBLE (A.
LaMothe trans. 1960); H.I& NmBUHR, supra note 16, at 42-48; M. STEINBERG, BASIC JUDAISM
57 (1947). See the reference to Job at note 50 supra. American lawyers have learned to
define their interpersonal professional obligations in terms of who has employed them, a
habit which sometimes creates problems where there need be none, and thereby causes law-
yers to define moral dilemmas poorly. See Kaplan, Legal Ethics Forum: The Case of the
Unwanted Will, 65 A.B.A.J. 484 (1979); Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the
Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N. CAR. L. REv. 520 (1979).
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E. Politics as Theology
The phenomenon of disloyalty by heroes also explains how the
hero who tells the truth with courage is saying two political things
to his community: (1) that its sense of its own power is exagger-
ated, and (2) that its sense of alternatives is too narrow. If my
analysis of Atticus's point of view is accurate, both of those points
about his story are theological. If the dominant symbol is the
Cross-which implies reconciliation," Jesus's teaching on suffering
servanthood ("revolutionary subordination" 89), and the lessons of
the Exodus-then any worldly government is limited, and limited
especially in its ability to work things out. Maycomb's religious
symbols, the stories they represent, and the theology of the stories
mean that the temple priests who argued in John 11 were not able
to prevent Roman suppression whether or not they sacrificed the
agitator and that Pharaoh was not able to prevent the escape of
Moses's people. God is Lord of all, and those who wield worldly
power either wield His power-in which case they had best act
truthfully-or they have no power.90
Once this is seen-and Maycomb needed to see this, even if it
already knew it-alternatives to official falsehood can be seen, too.
In Alabama the alternatives to official falsehood became clearer
under the leadership of a Baptist preacher, Martin Luther King,
Jr. King's point of view was professionally and habitually theologi-
cal. He preached that the truth of the theological symbols of tradi-
tional Alabama black, and white, Christianity required social
change. King's life illustrates-and, I think, Atticus's life does,
too-how the hero who courageously tells the truth acts politically.
IV. TELLING THE TRUTH AS PROFESSIONAL
The political identification of public and private morality, the bur-
dens of the gentleman as General Lee described them, and the
faith which is implied in the Christian religious symbol of suffering
servanthood came together for Maycomb in the Robinson case.
Perhaps they had come together for the national government in
87. See Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 11.
88. See H.R. NiEnuHR, supra note 16.
89. See J. YODER, supra note 55, at 163-92.
90. Most of modem Christian ethics is based on a radical assertion of this point. J.
GUSTAFSON, supra note 14, at 11-60; J. YODER, supra note 55, makes the even more radical
claim that this assertion is political.
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1932 when the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama." The
Court expressed all three of these pieces of professional truth tell-
ing when it said,
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, fee-
ble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether
requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law .... 92
Alabama had to correct its refusal to provide effective white law-
yers for black defendants in rape cases-in the Patterson case,
which Judge Horton tried in 1933, 9- and in the Robinson case in
which Judge Taylor appointed Atticus to defend Tom Robinson.
Atticus's behavior in the Robinson defense was evidently pro-
fessional, including his insistence on the truth. An historically fa-
miliar way to put this is to say that Atticus accepted appointment
to a priestly office, in the sense that American lawyers are the
priests of our civil religion 94 and in the sense that Miss Maudie
said Maycomb had commissioned Atticus to tell it the truth. The
two senses in which the office was priestly are different, though; it
seems to me that Atticus exceeded the first (advocacy) and
honored the second (truth telling) when he insisted on the truth
and thereby refused the circumstantial dispensation from responsi-
bility95 which another trial lawyer might have claimed in the case.
His telling of the truth, even if excessive, was nonetheless a profes-
sional act, an act which throws into question any lawyer profes-
sionalism which rests on untruth.
A lawyer has a choice in defining his function to himself. He
can define it with criteria which come from within the profession
itself, arguing that the function of the profession is useful to the
state which licenses lawyers and that his behavior in any circum-
stance can be determined by reference to this function. The "ad-
versary ethic" is that sort of definition of the function of lawyers.
Its failure as an ethic is its argument (often implicit) that the pur-
poses of the state are self-evidently good. The "adversary ethic" in
Maycomb had no way to confront the racism built into "the ad-
91. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
92. Id. at 71.
93. See note 6 supra.
94. See note 67 supra.
95. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at chs. 1-3; see also note 77 supra.
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ministration of justice" there. It won't do to say that it could have
appealed, ethically, to the purposes of another level of government,
e.g., the national state, which was able to invoke more clearly than
Maycomb doctrines on due process of law. However useful that ap-
peal might have been as a monetary tactic for the lawyers in Pow-
ell v. Alabama, it will not work as a moral argument because it has
no way to judge the purposes of the national state as it uses con-
cepts such as due process of law. The American national state in
1935 was not pure, as is evident from the Powell Court's limitation
of the right to counsel to the weak, the stupid and the "feeble
minded." If America was relatively purer in 1935 than, for exam-
ple, the national state in Germany, it is legitimate to note that
both national states proved themselves capable of terrifying
immorality.
In any event, Atticus did not argue from the clearer values of
another level of government; he argued from Maycomb County's
moral theology, from the idea (which Maycomb had dishonored) of
common good in a Christian community. He excised his view on
equality from an equality assured by the federal government (he
was, of course, alert to the feelings of his listeners): "Thomas Jef-
ferson once said that all men are created equal, a phrase that the
Yankees and the distaff side of the Executive branch in Washing-
ton are fond of hurling at us. There is a tendency in this year of
grace, 1935, for certain people to see this phrase out of context, to
satisfy all conditions .... But ... there is one human institution
that makes a pauper the equal of a Rockefeller, the stupid man the
equal of an Einstein, and the ignorant man the equal of any college
president. That institution, gentlemen, is a court . .. a living,
working reality. Gentlemen, a court is no better than each of you
sitting before me on this jury. . . .In the name of God, do your
duty."
Atticus's arguing from Maycomb's moral theology was as
much a professional act as his argument from the Constitution, the
Declaration of Independence or the egalitarian example of Mrs.
Roosevelt; his moral witness in the Robinson case was as theologi-
cal as it was professional. He did not define his professional func-
tion from criteria within the profession, but from the same criteria
he used when he talked to his children. He saw lawyering as part
of an order which was broader than the legal enterprise96-and this
96. Unless one defines the legal enterprise as participation in God's lordship. See R.
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had a number of consequences in the way he acted as a lawyer,
leader and gentleman in Maycomb.
For one thing, his argument on the treatment of black people
was not an argument from fairness (as the Supreme Court's was),
but was, rather, a substantive argument. An appeal to fairness was
unlikely in a community which systematically suppressed an entire
race of people; if fairness was the criterion in Maycomb, the very
law of the community had to be put on trial. To the extent that
the legal system in Maycomb rested on notions of fair procedure
which did not challenge its racism-and Atticus alluded to that
possibility in his jury speech-the system would not have led At-
ticus to insist on the truth. Coping with that system as it was, and
in conventional lawyer terms (fairness), would have required sys-
tematic untruth. An example is Gavin Stevens' planned defense of
Lucas Beauchamp in the Jefferson, Mississippi, murder case. On
the facts, Beauchamp either murdered the dead white farmer or he
did not kill him at all. Stevens did not believe Beauchamp when
the accused said he had not killed the farmer; Stevens proposed to
represent his client by officially claiming that Beauchamp had
done the deed but that the deed was manslaughter, an implausible
theory given the facts of the case.9
7
Atticus insisted on telling the truth, either knowing that the
truth would not free his client or not knowing what would happen
if the truth were told. (He seemed, in his jury speech, to have a
momentary optimism that the truth would lead to acquittal, but
his later reflections on the trial show that he knew there was no
basis for his optimism.) It seems to me that the best explanation
for his behavior is the theological explanation. One could say that
Atticus defined his task-a professional task which he defined pro-
fessionally-according to the law of love;"8 that his course was de-
termined out of the relationship he had with Tom Robinson, out of
a response to Tom Robinson himself as a truthful person-so that
RODEs, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE (1976).
97. W. FAuLKNmR, INTRUDER IN THE DUST 81 (1948). Gavin Stevens is a real hero-that
is, a flawed hero-too. See note 95 infra. See also A. VoRsPAN, GIANTS OF JUSTICE (1960), a
remarkable collection of stories of American Jewish leaders-all flawed, all eccentric, and all
heroes.
98. Martin Luther would have defined it this way, and John Wesley might have, too.
G. EBELING, LUTHER AN INTRODUCTION To His THOUGHT (R. Wilson trans. 1977). H. CARTER,
supra note 76, at 88 discusses Methodism being the origin of British socialism. See also K.
BARTH, DOGMATICS IN OUTLINE 28-34, 42-58 (G. Thompson trans. 1959); S. HAUERWAS, supra
note 9, at 111-26; Gustafson, Introduction to H.R. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963).
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in demanding that the truth be told, Atticus's case was his client
and his client was his case." Another way to theologically define
his function would be to say that he told the truth in hope: that is,
in an optimism born of his defining his client and himself (includ-
ing his professional life) in reference to the Cross. God is love and
God is Lord; even a doomed defendant and his lawyer can bear to
find and to tell the truth. The consequence of Atticus's thinking of
himself as a lawyer in these terms is that professional skill be-
comes hope (that is, both optimistic and truthful). His ability, as
Scout reported it, to proceed through the awful testimony and to
challenge the terrifying lies told there with civility ("with his infi-
nite capacity for calming turbulent waters, he could make a rape
case as dry as a sermon") is not only the practice of a lawyer's
technique; it is the practice of hope-hope as skill and skill as
hope.20 0
Atticus did not define what he was doing by reference to pro-
fessional function; he defined what he was doing by reference to
what I have called his moral theology.101 His theology was profes-
sional as well as political. His theology, as his own and as that of
his community, was also his theology as a lawyer. The sources of
this theology were his faith (Cross, reconciliation, exodus), his
community (which had unwittingly commissioned him to be its
truth teller), and his sense of himself as responsible for the weak
99. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 2, at ch. 8; M. BuBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 127
(1965). Compare the common experience of clients of law-reform lawyers who find that the
theories their lawyers use tend to leave behind the moral notions which convinced the cli-
ents to litigate. See, e.g., Harris, Annals of Law: A Scrap of Black Cloth, THE NEw YORKER,
June 17, 1974, at 82-84.
I can think of examples in which the fashioning of advocacy in this theological way will
promise less by way of judicial result than would a craftier strategy. See note 97 supra and
accompanying text. In the Robinson case, perhaps Atticus's jury speech should have empha-
sized more than it did the prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti. The screenplay
includes an argument on this point. H. Foorz, supra note 1, at 96. Defense counsel in the
Patterson case, see note 6 supra, declined to make that argument although the prgsecution
failed to prove that a rape had occurred. I think these choices were tactical, and thus
neither case presents facts on which to dearly compare the prophetic defense with the
crafty defense. To the extent that the choice was present in Maycomb, it was a matter for
moral discourse between Atticus and Tom Robinson. T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHnmsTviA
AN A LAWYER ch. 3 (1980). I doubt that Mr. Robinson would have chosen to forego the
telling of the truth-which was that Mayella Ewell had attempted to seduce him and then
lied about it---or that Atticus would have wanted him to do so.
100. See Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 11. See also HAuERWAs, supra note 9, at 30-
45, 117, discussing Iris Murdoch and Simon Weil, and using the artist as a paradigm.
101. See S. HAUERwAs, CsHi ucTR AND THE CHRISTIAN LIE A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL
ETHics 218-26 (1975).
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(even those who were not weak; those who were, out of delusions
Atticus shared, captive in weakness). These strains in his character
are expressed in General Lee's description of a gentleman. Lee's
idea sugge~ts Jefferson's vision of America as a community of
strong, self-sufficient and independent land owners,0 2 but Lee's
idea was tempered by his realization that America had people who
were weak, unresourceful and dependent. To Lee, I think, the
moral way to live as a Jeffersonian gentleman was to accept re-
sponsibility for the weak and to exercise advantage and power with
restraint and compassion. 103 In other words, Lee expressed the Jef-
fersonian notion with greater realism than the first Jeffersonians
had (Jefferson referred to America as "God's new Israel"), but Lee
expressed the Jeffersonian notion as it had to be expressed by one
who had the faith of the Cross, reconciliation and suffering
servanthood. 1° The gentleman is not an aristocrat so much as he is
a person who cares for the needs of others, and cares as well for
their feelings; the source of that idea for Atticus is not only Jeffer-
sonian democracy but also Christian faith. Of course, there were
delusions in that tradition, horrible 'delusions which caused
Maycomb to insure in economic and social custom that the weak
would remain weak, but our need for lawyer-heroes-and Atticus is
a lawyer, always a lawyer-is a need for real heroes. Real heroes
are only a little less deluded than their antagonists.
CONCLUSION
Heroes are identified by the needs of those who choose them.0 5
For every Thomas More, who was a lawyer-hero even before he
died, there are dozens (John Adams, St. Ives and Clarence Darrow
102. "Civil morality and self-determination were closely linked in republican thought,
and the theme of a virtuous and productive citizenry permeated much of the literature and
art of the new nation." Bloomfield, supra note 20, at 673. See note 79 supra.
103. See Gustafson, Introduction to H.&. NIE-UHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 39 (1963).
Harper Lee is a descendant of General Lee through her lawyer-father, Amasa Lee. "My
father," she said, "is one of the few men I've known who has genuine humility, and it lends
him a natural dignity. He has absolutely no ego drive, and so he is one of the most beloved
men in this part of the state." Literary Laurels for a Novice, LIFE, May 26, 1961, at 78A.
The part of the state to which she referred is Monroeville, Monroe County, in southwest
Alabama. Monroeville had a population just under 3,000 when To Kill A Mockingbird was
published. HAMMoN's AMBAsSADOR WORLD ATLAs 113, 303 (1954).
104. See R. NmBuHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1952). Jefferson regarded
the New Testament as important morally but not as a theological document. See J. GusTAF-
SON, supra note 14, at 189-95, 235-36.
105. See J. McCLENDON, supra note 53, at 170-203.
[Vol. 42:181
MORAL THEOLOGY
are perhaps lawyer examples) who are returned to the storehouse
of noble lives when the needs of a generation change. The question
in conclusion is why Atticus Finch, a self-educated, Depression-era,
Alabama country lawyer whose story is available only in the loving
account of his daughter, is a lawyer-hero appropriate in 1981. My
claim in this respect is that the American Bar has a need for a hero
who knew how to see and tell the truth and whose sense of himself
as a lawyer was not a compartment of his life but was the same
sense he had of himself as a person.
In some ways, Atticus was a throwback to the "Golden Era" of
American lawyers, those who built a legal system out of a revolu-
tion in the decades before 1830; it is in that sense that I have
called him a republican. Those lawyers identified public and pri-
vate morals. But as early as 1854, Judge Sharswood (chief justice,
law dean and eminent lawyer) could draw a working distinction
between what a lawyer had to do and "the high and pure morality
which breathes through the Sermon on the Mount." 106 No doubt,
by then most American lawyers had begun to practice the distinc-
tion in their professional lives; certainly the idea that professional
function defines professional morals has long been standard cate-
chism for lawyers and law students in America. The claim that a
lawyer must obey his conscience (and that his conscience is one
conscience, at home or in town) fades a little more every time the
profession recodifies its rules of professional behavior. Atticus was
pre-Sharswood; if the Sermon on the Mount meant something to
him-as I think it did-it was no less applicable in Judge Taylor's
court than it was when he took Jem by the hand and led him to
Mrs. Dubose's front porch. The argument Atticus has to make to
modern lawyers is that it is better to bear the discomfort of trying
to be a Christian (or a Jew) and a lawyer at the same time than it
is to pretend that the symbols of faith have nothing to do with law
offices, law schools or courts. 10 7
Atticus's belief that the truth can be borne, and therefore can
be sought and then revealed, is equally quaint in the face of the
strident argument of some leading trial lawyers that attorneys.
must, out of devotion to procedures suggested in the Constitution,
lie to courts and assist clients who want to lie to courts.0 8 A pres-
106. See note 75 supra.
107. See Brazil, The Attorney as Victim: Toward More Candor About the Psychologi-
cal Price Tag of Litigation Practices, 3 J. LEGAL PRO ESSION 107 (1978).
108. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); see
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tigious, broadly representative commission of the American Bar
Association, appointed to revise the ethical guidelines which Amer-
ican lawyers are required to follow, suggested in 1980 that a law-
yer's decision whether to assist clients who propose to lie must be
determined by reference to the needs of the government; if the
government decides that it must countenance the lies of its suitors,
then lawyers must lie, too.109 Atticus would not have understood
that devotion to the Constitution requires the untruthful practice
of law. Even less would he have understood that a lawyer's morals
are to be determined by the government. He might have noticed
that a position such as that of the A.B.A. draft could have led him
to support rather than defy the racist delusions of Maycomb. (And
it would have reduced the moral strength of his complaint to the
jury in the Robinson case, that the prosecution's witnesses were
liars.)
Scout began her story of the mad dog by saying that "Atticus
was feeble; he was nearly fifty." Lawyers and law students who
have read this far may decide that Atticus's moral witness is simi-
larly feeble in "the real world" of law practice. It is a paradox,
perhaps, that he remains popular-in hardcover, paperback,
screenplay and film, even on the late show. Like Maycomb, we law-
yers have a way of honoring heroes who should embarrass us; as
Scout said when Atticus was re-elected to the legislature, people
are just peculiar.110
Ordover, The Lawyer as Liar, 2 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 305 (1979).
109. ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.1 (Tent. Draft Feb., 1980). See
T. SHAFFER, LAW FOR THE INNOCENT ch. 9 (1980); Proposed Ethics Rules: A Try for Balance,
66 A.B.A. 277, 279 (1980).
110. I am grateful for the assistance of friends at Notre Dame, at Washington and Lee,
at home, and elsewhere, especially Joseph Bauer, Robert A. Burt, Herbert Fingarette,
Stanley Hauerwas, Frederick Lee Kirgis, Lewis H. LaRue, Andrew W. McThenia, David
Owen, Charles E. Rice, Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Brian C. Shaffer and Nancy J. Shaffer.
[Vol. 42:181
